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DESTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY:
ENEMY NATIONALS AND THE LEGAL




In the course of the Middle East conflict since 1948, both the
Arab states and Israel have tended to take harsh measures against
civilians based on their national, ethnic, and religious origins. This
practice has been partially legitimized by a norm in international law
that permits states to infringe the liberty and property interests of
enemy nationals during armed conflict. Middle Eastern governments
have misused the logic behind this theoretically exceptional rule to
justify far-reaching measures that undermine the "principle of
distinction" between civilians and combatants and erode the principle
of non-discrimination that lies at the center of human rights law.
In this article I trace the history of the enemy nationals
doctrine in international law and its application in the Middle East. I
argue that the enemy nationals doctrine, properly understood, in
most cases did not actually permit the types of policies applied in the
Middle East. Instead, the existence of the enemy nationals rule
produced ambiguity that governments could use to lend perceived
legitimacy to policies that were actually illegal. Because there were
inadequate international means by which to test the legality of such
policies, ambiguity in the law facilitated ethnic divisions that still
traumatize the region. The dangers posed by such ambiguities in law
- Michael Kagan (B.A. Northwestern 1997; J.D. Michigan 2000) is adjunct
faculty and a clinical instructor with the Refugee Rights Clinic at Tel Aviv
University's Buchmann Faculty of Law. The author is grateful to the Minerva
Center for Human Rights for supporting this research and to Anat Ben-Dor for
her assistance on recent Israeli legal developments.
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are an important reason to strengthen international judicial
mechanisms capable of addressing high-stakes issues.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this article I examine the norms of international law
governing the treatment of enemy nationals in wartime, with a
particular focus on how these norms have been applied in the course
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, this article is as much about the
misuse of law as it is about the evolution of particular legal norms.
The enemy nationals concept is in theory an exceptional rule
applicable only to a small set of foreigners and subject to substantial
regulation. It is questionable whether it even remains a valid rule of
international law today. But the logic behind the enemy nationals
idea is in many ways more important than the legal rule itself.
The enemy nationals doctrine presumes that in times of
international conflict, a person can be considered potentially
dangerous solely on the basis of his or her nationality. In theory, this
rule is based on the premise that formal nationality indicates a
person's political and military loyalties. This rule would appear
increasingly antiquated in an era when non-state actors often eclipse
the role of sovereign states in armed conflicts, as the recent war
between Israel and Lebanon illustrates. But during World War II,
the U.S. Supreme Court extended the enemy nationals logic to hold
that people can be considered dangerous solely on the basis of their
racial or national origin. The International Committee of the Red
Cross has promoted the concepts of "spiritual affinity" and
HeinOnline -- 38 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 264 2006-2007
DESTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY
"ideological affinity" to define enemy nationality. In times of ethnic
conflict, such concepts can easily be used to lend apparent
justification to policies that would otherwise be labeled illegitimate
discrimination.
In the Middle East, the logic behind the enemy nationals
concept has been aggressively used by Arab states and Israel to
define civilians as enemies on the basis of their ethnic, religious, or
national origins rather than on their actual involvement in armed
conflict. By this practice, Middle Eastern governments deepened the
Arab-Israeli conflict and undermined the "principle of distinction"
between civilians and combatants that lies at the center of
humanitarian law. The enemy nationals rule in international law
certainly did not cause the Arab-Israeli conflict, but it encouraged
policies that made the conflict much more difficult to resolve. As
such, this exceptional rule created legal ambiguity that essentially
prevented international law from playing the role it should have in
minimizing, managing, and eventually resolving conflict.
This study is relevant for two distinct reasons.
The first is to trace the evolution and current status of the
international legal rules governing treatment of enemy nationals in
wartime. Because its underlying logic is so easy to manipulate, the
enemy nationals doctrine threatens to weaken the protection of
civilians in armed conflict, erode protection of refugees, and facilitate
ethnic conflict. For these reasons, the treatment of enemy nationals
warrants legal analysis, especially at a time when the world's leading
military power is engaged in a long-term and open-ended "War on
Terror" in which the distinction between civilians and combatants is
increasingly blurred.
Second, law has played an understudied historical and
political role in fueling ethnic conflict by providing a measure of
moral legitimacy to discriminatory policies. My thesis is that
ambiguity surrounding legal doctrines can effectively legitimize
policies that are actually illegal. In this thesis I am building on the
recent work of Geremy Forman and Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar
describing the legal history of Israeli legislation relating to
Palestinian private property. Surveying research into several mid-
twentieth century ethnic conflicts, Forman and Kedar noted:
One relatively constant element of dispossession has been
the use of law in effecting and or normalizing the outcome.
The central role of legislation in such situations derives
from the fact that the provision, or, alternatively, the
20071 265
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transformation or negation of property rights, is invariably
institutionalized by some type of law. It is surprising, then,
that the role of legislation in the dispossession of displaced
ethnic and national groups has not received greater
academic attention.
The normalizing effect of law poses a particular problem when legal
norms are ambiguous on a high-stakes issue. I suggest that in some
situations, actual legality is not necessary to achieve the normalizing
effect that Forman and Kedar describe. A condition of legal
ambiguity is often sufficient to provide the legitimizing effect sought
by political actors.
Ambiguity is part and parcel of any legal process, and would
normally be addressed through a judicial mechanism that could
authoritatively decide how to interpret a specific principle in a
particular case. But these same ambiguities are likely to be exploited,
especially when international law is invoked as a political tool to
build up the perceived legitimacy of a particular policy. I argue that
the fact that most Arab and Israeli policies toward enemy nationals
have actually been in violation of international law did not prevent
the enemy nationals concept from providing a quasi-legal foundation
for destructive policies. When perception of legality matters more
than actual legality, ambiguity in the law becomes a dangerous
thing. At the same time, legal clarity is difficult to achieve when
judicial mechanisms are weak. This quandary poses a major
challenge to efforts to use international law as a means to manage
and resolve armed conflict, and is an argument in favor of
strengthening judicial mechanisms for interpreting international
law.
II. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE ENEMY NATIONALS CONCEPT
A. Origins: The recent decline of war booty
Modern humanitarian law is based on the idea that the
conduct of armed conflict should be regulated, especially so that
civilians and their property should not be a target of attack during
war. Though the distinction between civilians and combatants is now
1. Geremy Forman & Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, From Arab land to 'Israel
Lands'. The Legal Dispossession of the Palestinians Displaced by Israel in the
Wake of 1948, 22 Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 809, 810
(2004).
266
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a bedrock rule of humanitarian law, it has had a long historical
evolution that has continued up to the present. To some extent, the
modern protections have roots in ancient religious laws that can be
found in Jewish, Christian, and Muslim sources. To this extent,
modern humanitarian law probably represents relatively stable
norms of human morality. But until very recent history, certain types
of attacks on civilians were not just permitted but were considered
legitimate objects of warfare. This suggests that our modern
protections of civilians are quite fragile, and therefore vulnerable to
erosion. It is important to account for these fragile foundations in
order to understand the reasons why exceptions within humanitarian
law can be so easily exploited.
The three monotheistic religions generally permitted the
killing of combatants (defined as able men), while protecting civilians
(defined as women, children, and the elderly). But the religious laws
also allowed for war booty and spoils, a concept that remained part of
international law until the twentieth century. The Old Testament
spared women and children from execution, but allowed a conquering
army to take them and their property as spoils of war.
When you draw near to a town to fight against it, offer it
terms of peace. If it accepts your terms of peace and
surrenders to you, then all the people in it shall serve you
at forced labor. If it does not submit to you peacefully, but
makes war against you, then you shall besiege it; and when
the Lord your God gives it into your hand, you shall put all
its males to the sword. You may, however, take as your
booty the women, the children, livestock, and everything
else in the town, all its spoil. You may enjoy the spoil of
your enemies, which the Lord your God has given you. 2
The concept of spoils is also mentioned in the New Testament.3
Like the Old Testament, Qur'anic law prescribed limits on
warfare for the protection of civilian lives: "Fight in the cause of God
those who fight you, but do not transgress limits. God loveth not
transgressors."4 But Qur'anic law also allowed Muslims to take spoils
2. Deuteronomy 20:10-14 (New Revised Standard Version).
3. Luke 11:21-22 (Revised Standard Version) ("When a strong man, fully
armed, guards his own palace, his goods are in peace; but when one stronger than
he assails him and overcomes him, he takes away his armor in which he trusted,
and divides his spoil.").
4. Qu'ran Sura 2:190 (The Meaning of the Holy Qur'an: New Edition and
Revised Translation and Commentary (Abdullah YusufAli trans. 1992)).
20071
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and booty of war, so long as they were distributed according to the
Islamic mandate to give alms to the poor:
And know that out of all the booty that ye may acquire (in
war), a fifth share is assigned to Allah, and to the
Messenger, and to near relatives, orphans, the needy and
the wayfarer.... 5 But (now) enjoy what ye took in war,
lawful and good; but fear Allah.
These religious sources can be read in at least two ways. A
humanitarian reading would see the Biblical and Qu'ranic
protections of women, children, the elderly, and the needy as the seed
of modern legal protections of civilians in wartime. But a political
realist reading would argue that the "limits" on warfare appear only
as disciplinary rules for the self-interest of the victors. Women and
children are not protected because they have rights; they are given
the same status as cattle because they can be used later.7 The
humanitarian reading would indicate that twentieth century
expansions of civilian protection in wartime are new branches on a
tree with very deep roots. But the realist reading would lead us to the
conclusion that the distinction between civilians and combatants is in
fact a recent and possibly radical idea.8
5. Qu'ran, supra note 4, Sura 8:41.
6. Qu'ran, supra note 4, Sura 8:69.
7. The Old Testament in particular appears to conceptualize war as total
conflict between peoples, with the victor being justified in killing all civilians in a
practice that today might be labeled genocide. After prescribing rules for
governing attacks on enemy cities, Deuteronomy continues with a passage calling
for the Hebrews to "annihilate" (20:17) those groups who inhabit "towns ... that
the Lord your God is giving you as an inheritance... You must not let anything
that breathes remain alive."(20:16).
8. In the wake of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war, the difference between
these two interpretations was illustrated in sharp debates among Jewish and
Muslim clerics about whether religious law permitted the killing of enemy
civilians. Compare Rabbinical Council of America, RCA solidarity mission to
Israel expresses view of "Tohar Haneshek" in light of the unprecedented realities of
recent war with Hezbollah (Aug. 17, 2006), available at http://www.rabbis.org/
news/article.cfm?id=100826 ("Judaism would neither require nor permit a Jewish
soldier to sacrifice himself in order to save deliberately endangered enemy
civilians.") with Barry Leff, For purity of arms, The Jerusalem Post (Sept. 4,
2006) (arguing that rabbinical interpretation of Biblical law forbids killing
innocent people and requires that violence be used only proportionately). See also
Alain Navarro, Muslim authorities disown fatwas on killing Jews, The Daily Star
Egypt (Aug. 24, 2006) (describing a debate between Egyptian clerics on whether
the Lebanon war justified killing Israeli Jews who visit Egypt).
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In secular humanitarian law, civilian property was
considered a legitimate object of warfare (spoils of war) until at least
the nineteenth century. It wasn't until the twentieth century that
civilian property earned clear protection in international law, and it
was not until World War II that civilians were clearly protected. In
early secular international law, war booty and pillage were permitted
because property was viewed as linked to sovereignty. In medieval
norms, civilian lives might be spared by the principle of jus
armorum,9 but civilian property was a legitimate object of warfare.
International law considered "that war declared against a particular
sovereign necessarily implied war against all his subjects, collectively
or individually, wherever found." ° When a new sovereign acquired
territory, pre-existing property claims were considered essentially
moot. 11
The first dent in the spoils of war doctrine came during the
Enlightenment when European legal publicists and political
philosophers began to describe property as a natural institution that
is a foundation of the state, rather than being founded on the state. 12
John Locke linked a person's personal liberty to ownership of the
products of his labor, and concluded that "[t]hus Labour, in the
Beginning, gave a Right of Property."13 The spoils of war doctrine
eroded further in the nineteenth century as courts and governments
began seeing private property as a right that could continue
9. Hilaire McCoubrey, International Humanitarian Law 177 (2d ed. 1998).
10. Coleman Phillipson, International Law and the Great War 93 (1915).
11. See L. Benjamin Ederington, Property as a Natural Institution: The
Separation of Property from Sovreignty in International Law, 13 Am. U. Int'l L.
Rev. 263 (1997).
12. In his study of the evolution of property rights in international law,
Ederington cites Hugo Grotius' De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres (1625) and
Emmerich Vattel's The Law of Nations (1797) as particularly influential in
reconceptualizing property as a natural right independent of sovereignty. Id. at
266, 268.
13. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 317 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690). Locke explains this conclusion by arguing:
Every Man has a Property in his own Person.... The Labour of
his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly
his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature
hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with,
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independent of changes in sovereignty. 14 Treaties began to prohibit
confiscation of private property in wartime, so that one leading
treatise on international law reports that there has not been a case of
legal wartime private property confiscation since the 1793 war
between Britain and France.1 5
In 1833 the U.S. Supreme Court cited customary
international law in a case concerning a Spanish private property
claim in Florida (which the US had acquired from Spain). The Court
held that even if a sovereign changes, people's "relations with each
other, and their rights of property, remain undisturbed." 6 This
principle was affirmed in the early twentieth century by the
Permanent Court of International Justice in the German Settlers
Case. 7 Today, the concept of war booty is limited to moveable state
property, which may be taken only by a state. An individual soldier
who takes booty would commit the crime of pillage. 8
Before World War I, the new concept that civilians and their
property should be protected during wartime became enshrined in
treaty law. For protection of private property, the most important
instruments in ending (or at least limiting) the war booty doctrine
were the 1899 Hague Conference and the 1907 Hague Convention IV
respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (hereafter "Hague
Convention") and its annexed Regulations concerning the Laws and
Customs of War on Land (hereafter "Hague Regulations"). The Hague
Regulations remain among the most specific set of rules protecting
public and private property during armed conflict.
By World War II, the Hague Convention's provisions
(including its protections of property) had become binding customary
norms so that violations could be considered prosecutable war
crimes.' 9 The 1945 London Charter establishing the Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg defined "plunder of public or private
property" as a war crime.2 ° In its final judgment, the Nuremberg
14. Ederington, supra note 11, at 263; Phillipson, supra note 10, at 94.
15. Oppenheim's International Law 326 (7th ed. 1952).
16. U.S. v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 87 (1833) (Marshall, C.J.).
17. Questions Relating to Settlers of German Origin in Poland, Advisory
Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 6 (Sept. 10).
18. See Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of
International Armed Conflict 215 (2004).
19. Id. at 10.
20. Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at 6(b), in
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
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Tribunal stated, "[By 1939 these rules laid down in the [Hague]
Convention were recognized by all civilized nations, and were
regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war."2' The
International Court of Justice has held that the Hague Regulations
constitute customary norms.22
The Hague Regulations provide protection to both private
and public property. Its provisions protect virtually any immoveable
property of a civilian character; they explicitly protect not just
private property, but also public and municipal state property. The
only property confiscations that would be legitimate are those
justified by military necessity,23 and those of state-owned financial
the European Axis (London Agreement), Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No.
472, 82 U.N.T.S. 280.
21. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences,
1946, 41 Am. J. Int'l L. 172, 248-9 (1947). Accord International Military Tribunal
for the Far East (Tokyo), 1948, [1948] AD 356, 366.
22. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. at para. 89 (July 9)
[hereinafter Wall in OPT Advisory Opinion] available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2007).
23. The following are the most important provisions:
Article 23
[Ilt is especially forbidden . . . (g) To destroy or seize the
enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.
Article 28
The pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, is
prohibited.
Article 46
[P]rivate property.., must be respected.
Article 47
Pillage is formally forbidden.
Article 53
An army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds,
and realizable securities which are strictly the property of the
State, depots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies,
and generally, all movable property belonging to the State
which may be used for military operations ....
Article 56
The property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to
religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, even
when State property, shall be treated as private property. All
seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions of
this character, historic monuments, works of art and science, is
forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal proceedings.
2007]
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and moveable property "which may be used for military operations."24
The concept of prohibited property seizure has been given a broad,
functional interpretation. During the A. Krupp trial at Nuremberg,
the defense argued that the prohibition on seizure in occupied
territory would only be violated if there is a definite transfer of title.
The Tribunal rejected this argument, noting that customary law
required "respect" for private property, and explaining that an
occupying army depriving a factory owner of the use of his factory
could constitute a war crime.
The protections afforded property in the Hague Regulations
were soon extended to people via the "principle of distinction"26
between combatants and non-combatants, which the International
Court of Justice has called an "intransgressible" rule of customary
international law. 7 The basis of this distinction is the principle that
military operations should be directed only at military objectives.
The coinage 'military objectives' first came into use in the
(non-binding) 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare. It was
replicated in the 1949 Geneva Conventions (which fail to
define it), the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention
(and especially the 1999 Second Protocol appended to the
Hague Convention), as well as the 1998 Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court.28
B. Enemy aliens or enemy race? British and U.S. policies in
World War II
Almost as soon as the civilian-military distinction gained a
foothold in international law, it was subject to important exceptions.
Despite their general protection of civilian property, the Hague
Regulations allow property confiscations for military purposes as
"imperatively demanded by the necessities of war,"29 and do not
Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Regulations
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 183
[hereinafter Hague Regulations].
24. Hague Regulations, supra note 23, art. 53.
25. Kriangsak Kittichaissaree, International Criminal Law 174-75 (Oxford
University Press 2001).
26. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 26, 257 (July 8).
27. Id.
28. Dinstein, supra note 18, at 82-83.
29. Hague Regulations, supra note 23, art. 23(g).
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prevent a warring state from taking "many kinds of measures
against enemy persons and enemy property" as part of an overall war
effort.3" The theory behind this is that civilian assets could be used to
generate funds for the war effort.3' Beyond their assets, enemy
nationals were presumed during World War I and II to be potentially
dangerous as saboteurs or spies. Both Britain and the United States
adopted this logic during the two world wars, but through very
different policies. British policies became precedents for substantial
regulation of the enemy nationals rule. American policies illustrated
how easily the underlying logic of the enemy nationals rule can be
used to support across-the-board discrimination against particular
racial groups.
1. British policies toward enemy nationals
In World War I, the 1914 British Enemy (Amendment) Act
created a custodian of enemy property in order to collect revenues on
German property, a practice continued in World War 11.32 British
policies toward the property of enemy nationals were then revived in
the Second World War with the Trading with the Enemy Law of
1939. 33 These measures defined a person's enemy character in terms
of his place of residence, not his nationality or permanent domicile (in
law, domicile is more permanent, while residence can be
temporary).34 In World War II, this meant that even nationals of
neutral states could have enemy character if they were voluntarily
present in Germany, or even in German-occupied territory, during
the war.35 The purpose of appointing a custodian was not to
permanently seize the property (which would violate the Hague
Regulations), but to hold it in escrow until the end of hostilities.3 6
The Allies in World War II took steps against the persons of
enemy nationals, not only their property, especially by imposing
restrictions on their freedom of movement and in some cases placing
them in internment camps. These policies were motivated by fears
30. Oppenheim, supra note 15, at 268-69.
31. Id. at 399, 407; see Phillipson, supra note 10, at 101.
32. Oppenheim, supra note 15, at 327-28.
33. Eyal Benvenisti & Eyal Zamir, Private Claims to Property Rights in the
Future Israeli-Palestinian Settlement, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 295, 302-03 (1995);
Forman & Kedar, supra note 1, at 7.
34. See Lord McNair & A.D. Watts, The Legal Effects of War 78 (1966).
35. McNair & Watts, supra note 34, at 89, 91.
36. Oppenheim's International Law, supra note 15, at 333-35.
20071
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that enemy nationals would engage in espionage or sabotage. But
early in the war, the British authorities recognized that many or
most of the Germans who remained abroad after September 1939
were actually refugees who "feel no loyalty to the National Socialist
Government.... Therefore, although they are 'enemies' by origin,
speech, and culture, they are often admirers of the enemy state in
which they live."37
The British Government defined three categories of enemy
aliens. Every German in the country was required to register and be
screened by police, and 112 aliens tribunals were set up around the
country.38 "Class A" enemy nationals were considered actual threats
and were subject to internment. "Class B" was a middle ground
category that avoided internment, but restricted people from moving
more than five miles from their homes and from possessing cameras
or driver's licenses. "Class B" aliens were also required to report
regularly to police. 39 "Class C" aliens were subject to no restrictions
and had "Refugee from Nazi Oppression" stamped on their
registration cards.40 The British tribunals found the vast majority of
the "enemy aliens" in the country to in fact be "Class C" refugees
(86.7% out of 74,233 cases); during the first six months of the system,
only 2.5% of the "enemy nationals" were interned.4'
The British policy toward enemy aliens in World War II set a
remarkable precedent in several respects. First, the work of the
aliens tribunals provided powerful empirical evidence that in a
conventional war, formal ties to an enemy sovereign do not
necessarily make a person a genuine threat. Second, from a political
point of view, the British tribunals stand out given that another
government might easily have adopted a more reactionary approach.
The British aliens tribunals worked mainly early in the war when
Britain was under the most dire military threat from Germany and
when one might have expected the greatest pressure of xenophobia
against Germans. Indeed, Britain's nuanced World War II policy was
a marked departure from World War I precedents, when the country
37. Robert M. W. Kempner, The Enemy Alien Problem in the Present War,
34 Am. J. Int'l L. 443, 444 (1940).
38. Id. at 444-45.
39. Id. at 445.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 446.
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interned ninety-nine percent of the enemy aliens in the country. 42 It
also stands in stark contrast to American policies.
2. American policies toward people of Japanese origin
The United States took a much harsher and less nuanced
approach toward people of Japanese ancestry than Britain did
toward German citizens. In large part, this was the result of simple
racism, evidenced by the fact that American policy toward Japanese
differed from American treatment of Germans. Yet the American
approach in World War II also was founded on a differing conception
of the enemy. Both British and American policymakers quickly came
to the conclusion that formal nationality alone was a poor indicator of
whether a person was actually dangerous. But while this observation
led Britain to intern fewer people, it led Americans in the opposite
direction. American policymakers, and later judges, came to the
conclusion that ethnic and national origins were more important
than citizenship in identifying potential threats. The concept of an
enemy race thus became a substitute for the concept of an enemy
nationality.
In its early phases, American policy during World War II
targeted only foreign nationals. Initially after entering the war,
President Roosevelt authorized the detention of any aliens deemed
"dangerous to public peace or safety."43 On January 13, 1942, British
Prime Minister Winston Churchill urged Roosevelt to follow the
British in setting up tribunals to assess the actual danger posed by
Japanese, Germans, and Italians in the United States." Churchill is
reported to have told Roosevelt, "We separated the goats from the
sheep, interned the goats and used the sheep.""5 For non-Japanese,
the United States set up Alien Enemy Hearing Boards which
released around a quarter of the aliens detained in the first year
after American entry into the war.46 Yet, in the United States even
those released lived with restrictions on their freedom of movement.47
42. Id.
43. Greg Robinson, By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of
Japanese Americans 75 (2001).
44. Id. at 93.
45. Id.
46. Robert R. Wilson, Treatment of Civilian Alien Enemies, 37 Am. J. Int'l L.
30, 42 (1943).
47. Id. at 43.
20071
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Hence, even if one looks only at treatment of Germans, the United
States took a more harsh approach than Britain.
The racial rather than national approach toward Japanese in
the United States had its origins in long standing discrimination that
had little to do with armed conflict. There had been nativist groups
pushing for restrictions on Japanese long before World War 11.48 A
discriminatory anomaly of American immigration law regarding
Japanese blurred the line between enemy aliens (a category that in
theory should apply only to foreigners) and citizens of Japanese
descent. U.S. law restricted Japanese immigration in 1907 and
banned it in 1924. "First-generation immigrants from Japan, who
were known as Issei, were resident aliens.., forbidden by law from
ever becoming naturalized citizens.'49 Their children, known as Nisei,
were born in the United States and were hence American citizens. °
This meant that there was a large group of people in the United
States in 1941 who had been permanent residents for decades and
who were parents of American citizens, but who were nominally
foreigners.
The United States has had a law against enemy nationals on
its statute books since the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts. It is still in
place today,5 having been amended only in 1918.52 It permits the
President to issue a proclamation for "all natives, citizens, denizens,
or subjects of the hostile nation or government.., to be apprehended,
restrained, secured, and removed as alien enemies." The months
following Pearl Harbor saw anti-Japanese hysteria sweep the United
States.53 The xenophobia influenced American policymakers as much
as actual or perceived security fears.54 Executive Order 9066, signed
by Roosevelt on February 19, 1942, 55 did not mention Japanese
residents by name. It simply gave wide discretion to the Department
of War to designate military areas from which "any or all persons
48. Robinson, supra note 43, at 90.
49. Id. at 4.
50. Id.
51. 50 U.S.C.S. § 21 (2006).
52. The 1798 version had applied only to men over age 14. The 1918
amendment removed the gender limitation and applied the law to both sexes. 5
Cong. Ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798), amended by 50 U.S.C.S. § 21 (1918).
53. Robinson, supra note 43, at 89-90.
54. Id. at 112.
55. Exec. Order 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
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may be excluded... " 56 This became the legal basis for forcibly
displacing and interning more than 100,000 people. Around seventy
percent were American-born Nisei who were U.S. citizens. 7 On the
eve of President Roosevelt's executive order authorizing the
internment, General John L. DeWitt spoke not of enemy aliens but of
an "enemy race.""8
In one of its most infamous twentieth century decisions,
Korematsu v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held this
internment to be constitutionally justified by military necessity. 9
Korematsu was convicted of refusing to register for relocation to an
internment area away from the West Coast. The decision by Justice
Black began with an analytical premise that is essential to civil
rights law and equal protection doctrine: "It should be noted, to begin
with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a
single racial group are immediately suspect."60 The Court said that
such restrictions must be subject to "rigid scrutiny" because "pressing
public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such
restrictions; racial antagonism never can."6' But the Korematsu Court
ultimately upheld the internment as a sensible military measure
with relatively little scrutiny:
To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without
reference to the real military dangers which were
presented, merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not
excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him
or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the
Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military
authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt
constrained to take proper security measures, because they
decided that the military urgency of the situation
demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be
segregated from the West Coast temporarily, and finally,
because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of
war in our military leaders-as inevitably it must-
determined that they should have the power to do just this.
There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the
military authorities considered that the need for action was
56. Robinson, supra note 43, at 108.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 106.
59. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
60. Id. at 216.
61. Id.
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great, and time was short. We cannot-by availing
ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight-now say
that at that time these actions were unjustified.62
The Korematsu decision reflected excessive deference to the
military during times of war more than it did direct racism. To some
extent the Court was saying one thing about the law-that racial
restrictions require rigid scrutiny-while doing something else with
the actual facts at hand. Had Justice Black's opinion for the Court
actually scrutinized the empirical basis of the military's decision and
the availability of other alternatives, a different conclusion might
have been reached. Instead, the Court justified its assumption that
people of Japanese ancestry posed a military threat through
uncritical references to the assertions of "our military leaders." The
Court reasoned, in essence, that military necessity could justify
internment based on ancestry, and that military leaders can be
trusted to decide on their own whether people of a particular ancestry
pose an actual threat.
But the Korematsu case followed another decision with
almost identical facts, Hirabayashi v. United States,63 in which Chief
Justice Stone offered a more developed defense of using national or
ethnic ancestry as an indicator of military threat. Chief Justice
Stone's reasoning began with the premise that the government had to
take some harsh measures to contain the threat purportedly posed by
hostile civilians, and that it was reasonable to look for some means of
focusing its restrictions so as to not infringe the liberty of everyone:
The alternative [to interning only people of Japanese
descent] which the appellant insists must be accepted is for
the military authorities to impose the curfew on all citizens
within the military area, or on none. In a case of threatened
danger requiring prompt action, it is a choice between
inflicting obviously needless hardship on the many, or
sitting passive and unresisting in the presence of the
threat.
Chief Justice Stone thus implicitly dismissed the idea of interning
only individuals about whom there were specific reasons for concern,
as Britain was doing at the same time. 65 But Chief Justice Stone also
62. Id. at 223-24.
63. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
64. Id. at 95.
65. Had the United States adopted the British approach, it seems highly
unlikely that Hirabayashi would have been considered a threat. He was born in
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dismissed the idea of limiting internment to foreigners. He argued
that the central question was not formal nationality but "the nature
of our inhabitants' attachments to the Japanese enemy," which he
called "a matter of grave concern."66 Noting that the majority of
people of Japanese descent on the West Coast were actually citizens
of the United States, he explained why formal nationality was not a
reliable indicator of enemy identity:
There is support for the view that social, economic and
political conditions which have prevailed since the close of
the last century, when the Japanese began to come to this
country in substantial numbers, have intensified their
solidarity and have in large measure prevented their
assimilation as an integral part of the white population....
The restrictions, both practical and legal, affecting the
privileges and opportunities afforded to persons of Japanese
extraction residing in the United States, have been sources
of irritation and may well have tended to increase their
isolation, and in many instances their attachments to
Japan and its institutions. 67
With this, the U.S. Supreme Court used the underlying theory
behind enemy nationals rules-that connections to a hostile power
can justify infringements on liberty-to defend the alternative policy
of infringing the liberty of an entire race or ethnic group. First, Chief
Justice Stone cited maintenance of minority culture (i.e. failure to
integrate) as a general warning sign of disloyalty. Second, without
citing extensive evidence, he made loose allegations that "some"
Japanese schools and institutions were "generally believed" to be
disseminating enemy "propaganda." Third, he stated vaguely that
some people of Japanese descent maintained contacts with Japanese
consulates, no doubt because many were Japanese citizens. Fourth,
he acknowledged that the U.S. government had been discriminating
against Japanese people for a long time, but said that this makes
their loyalty even more suspect because they had good reason to feel
closer to Japan than to America.
It is easy to see Chief Justice Stone's opinion as a shameful
exercise in insinuation, guilt by association and simple racism. But
Seattle, educated in public schools, and was a senior at the University of
Washington at the time of his arrest. He had never visited Japan, and had no
documented contacts with anyone in Japan. Id. at 84.
66. Id. at 96.
67. Id. at 96-98.
2007]
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his reasoning cannot be dismissed so easily. The idea in international
law that states may restrict the rights of enemy nationals is based on
the idea that foreigners may be reasonably suspected of having
hostile allegiances. What was novel about Chief Justice Stone's
reasoning was that he saw formal nationality as a weak indicator of
affiliation with the enemy, and therefore thought it reasonable to
look instead at race. Empirically, it is hardly unreasonable to assume
that ancestry bears a strong correlation to political opinion. By
making this simple observation, Chief Justice Stone used the long-
standing logic behind restrictions on enemy nationals to justify
interning people based solely on their ancestry. This shows how
easily the enemy nationals rule can be used to legitimize more far
reaching forms of discrimination.
Though notorious for upholding the Japanese internment,
Korematsu was an analytical step forward for the principle of non-
discrimination in American civil rights law. Because the Court had
dealt with an almost identical case one year earlier, the Korematsu
decision could easily have been redundant.68 But Korematsu at least
established the rule that racially-based restrictions are suspect and
subject to heightened scrutiny. Hirabayashi stated only that racial
distinctions are "in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore
prohibited" but that the government could nevertheless conclude that"a group of one national extraction may menace [public] safety more
than others."69
C. Codification of "exceptional measures"
After World War II, the British policies toward enemy aliens
became the precedent for several provisions in widely ratified
treaties, providing for the first time a codified set of rules regulating
the measures that states may take against enemy nationals. The
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 on the Protection of Civilians in
Wartime and the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
both prescribe important limits, while simultaneously acknowledging
that the enemy nationals concept has a legitimate place in
68. Hirabayashi concerned a person convicted for resisting a curfew imposed
on people of Japanese descent, while Korematsu concerned relocation and
internment.
69. Hirabyashi, 320 U.S. at 100.
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international law. 70 The less widely ratified 1954 Convention relating
to the Status of Stateless Persons contains a provision analogous to
the one in the Refugee Convention limiting the doctrine's application
to stateless persons.7'
The most comprehensive codification of the treatment of
enemy nationals in wartime appears in the Fourth Geneva
Convention in articles 35 through 44. These provisions contain four
primary rules. First, the Convention states explicitly that warring
states may impose restrictions on enemy nationals, including
confinement, internment, or assigned residence. 72  Second, the
Convention provides that enemy nationals must be considered
protected persons, and therefore are entitled to humane treatment,
medical care, and religious services, along with provisions for
employment and livelihood.73 Third, the Convention requires states to
review any internment or assigned residence in individualized
hearings every six months,74 and permits internment "only if the
security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary. " 75
Fourth, the Convention prohibits the application of enemy nationals
measures to refugees.
At the urging of Israel and the International Refugee
Organization (the predecessor of the High Commissioner for
Refugees), the Geneva Convention drafters aimed to enshrine in law
the British practice from World War II of excepting refugees from
enemy nationals policies.76 The Fourth Geneva Convention's article
44 provides:
70. See Lisa L. Turner & Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Tip of the Spear,
51 A.F. L. Rev. 1, 84-85 (2001).
71. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, adopted Sept.
28, 1954, art. 1, 360 U.N.T.S. 117, 136 (entered into force March 6, 1960). Of the
states discussed in this article, only Israel is a party to the Status of Stateless
Persons Convention; none of the Arab states bordering Israel have signed it.
United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with
the Secretary-General, available at http://untreaty.un.org(ENGLISH/
bible/englishinternetbible/bible.asp (last visited Jan. 17, 2007).
72. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 37, 42, 41, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
73. Id. arts. 37-40, 75 U.N.T.S. at 310-14.
74. Id. art. 43.
75. Id. art. 42.
76. International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary, Convention
(IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949,
2007]
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In applying the measures of control mentioned in the
present Convention, the Detaining Power shall not treat as
enemy aliens exclusively on the basis of their nationality de
jure of an enemy State, refugees who do not, in fact, enjoy
the protection of any government.
By this provision, the Fourth Geneva Convention codified the limits
on enemy nationals restrictions developed during World War II. The
International Committee of the Red Cross commentary on the article
notes:
Various belligerent countries made allowances for this state
of affairs by introducing laws exempting such persons from
measures taken against enemy aliens. This course was, for
example, adopted in certain English-speaking countries
where the number of refugees was particularly high.7
The 1951 Refugee Convention contains a complementary
provision in its article 8:
With regard to exceptional measures which may be taken
against the person, property or interests of nationals of a
foreign State, the Contracting States shall not apply such
measures to a refugee who is formally a national of the said
State solely on account of such nationality. Contracting
States which, under their legislation, are prevented from
applying the general principle expressed in this article,
shall, in approiate cases, grant exemptions in favour of
such refugees.
The drafting history of the Refugee Convention suggests that states
wanted to reaffirm article 44 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and
perhaps extend it. The International Refugee Organization, which
proposed the original text for the Refugee Convention, made explicit
reference to article 44 and to the history of state practice that
produced it. 79 The U.N. Secretary General asked states to extend a
art. 44, available at http://www.icrc.orgihl.nsf/COM380-600050?OpenDocument
(last visited Jan. 17, 2007) [hereinafter ICRC Commentary].
77. ICRC Commentary, supra note 76.
78. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted July 28, 1951,
art. 8, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 159-60 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter
Refugee Convention]
79. See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Ad Hoc Committee on
Statelessness and Related Problems, United States of America: Memorandum on
the Definition Article of the Preliminary Draft Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees (and stateless Persons), art. 25, UN Doc. E/AC.32.2, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3ae68c164.html (last visited Jan. 29,
2007).
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rule written for wartime to peacetime as well. 80 The Refugee
Convention extends not just to times of war but also to "threat of war
or severance of diplomatic relations or other tension between two
states." 8 By extending the refugee exemption beyond armed conflict,
the Refugee Convention in some ways offers more protection than the
Fourth Geneva Convention. But in other ways the Refugee
Convention's final text is more equivocal, or at least considerably less
clear. Article 8's second sentence appears to allow domestic
legislation to override the rule of international law, provided only
that there be a vague possibility of making an exception "in
appropriate cases." 2 This second sentence "was added in the
Conference of Plenipotentiaries after a prolonged and seemingly
confused discussion."83 Commentators have tended to see the second
sentence as merely giving states an option whether to implement the
basic principle by changing their legislation or by making individual
exemptions for refugees.84 In any case, the Refugee Convention's
equivocation is of little legal importance unless a state enters a
reservation to article 44 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.85
While the Refugee Convention's article 8 prohibits
exceptional measures against refugees based solely on their
nationality, article 9 allows states "in time of war or other grave and
80. See id. (NI]f this rule is to be applied in time of war, a similar rule must
a fortiori be applied in time of peace.") See generally Atle Grahl-Madsen,
Commentary on the Refugee Convention art. 8 para. 1 1951 (1963, re-published by
UNHCR 1997) (explaining article 8 of the Refugee Convention, which deals with
exceptional measures).
81. Grahl-Madsen, supra note 80, art. 8 para. 2 ("The article also applies to
measures taken in peace-time, e.g. during crises of a non-military type (economic
or financial crises), or retaliation and retortion against subjects of States with
which a temporary disagreement exists, for example over the payment of a
substantial sum as damages."). See also Nehemiah Robinson, Convention
Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons: Its History and Interpretation
(originally published by World Jewish Congress 1955; re-printed by UNHCR
1997).
82. See Robinson, supra note 81, art. 8 para. 3 ("The second sentence
considerably restricts the import of this article.").
83. Grahl-Madsen, supra note 80, art. 8 para. 1.
84. Id. art. 8 paras. 7-9 ("The expression 'in appropriate cases' may seem
vague, but ... it seems clear that it refers to any and all cases where measures
are taken against aliens solely on account of their nationality.").
85. Robinson, supra note 81, art. 8 para. 5 ("Unless they enter a reservation
to Article 44 of the latter Convention, they will have to adhere to it regardless of
the limitation permitted under this Convention.").
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exceptional circumstances" to take measures for the sake of national
security "in the case of a particular person."86 Articles 8 and 9 hence
represent a clear trade-off. On the one hand, they substantially
restrict governments' authority to take sweeping measures against
all members of a particular nationality. Yet they grant states broad
authority to take measures against particular individuals who are
believed to pose security threats.
These overlapping provisions put the enemy nationals
doctrine on awkward legal footing. In the aftermath of World War II,
the idea that foreigners' rights might be restricted in wartime
because of their enemy nationality received explicit sanction in
several widely ratified treaties. While these treaties seriously curtail
the use of the enemy nationals concept, they do not prohibit using
enemy nationality as a warning factor of potential security danger in
individual cases. Yet the regulatory framework established by these
treaties attempts to strike a difficult balance. They completely
exempt refugees from the rule and establish a general requirement
that states must limit the harshest measures against enemy
nationals to cases of absolute necessity. By requiring periodic
individual hearings of any case of internment, the Fourth Geneva
Convention actually prohibits detention based solely on nationality.
Instead, there must be an individualized assessment of each case.87
This raises questions about the principle underlying the entire
doctrine, which is by definition a means of restricting the rights of
whole groups. The ICRC has stated:
When the Convention stipulates that the position of an
enemy alien must not be considered solely in the light of his
legal nationality, it in fact invites belligerents to take into
consideration a whole set of circumstances which may
reveal what might be called the "spiritual affinity" or
"ideological allegiance" of a protected person.88
This leaves the door at least slightly open for a government to
consider an individual's national, religious, political, and ethnic
background in assessing whether he or she poses a real threat. The
ICRC's approach is thus only slightly removed from Chief Justice
Stone's reasoning in Hirabayashi.
86. See Grahl-Madsen, supra note 80, art. 8 para. 1.
87. See Christine Ann Lobasso, Elevation of the Individual: International
Legal Issues That Flow From the American Internment of the West Coast
Japanese during World War 1I, 8 Touro Int'l L. Rev. 45, 46-47, 61-62 (1998).
88. ICRC Commentary, supra note 76.
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Today, the enemy nationals concept's legal validity is subject
to even more doubt, though it has never been explicitly abolished by a
treaty. Today, the internment of the Japanese is widely considered a
notorious and shameful episode in American history, though its legal
status is more ambiguous. Neither Korematsu nor Hirabayashi have
ever been explicitly reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Yet in 1976
President Gerald Ford issued a proclamation entitled "An American
Promise" that included a formal apology for the internment of
Japanese-Americans, and called on the American people to ensure
that it never be repeated. 9 In 1986, a federal district court vacated
Mr. Hirabayashi's 1942 conviction for resisting internment, largely
because the government had concealed evidence revealing that racial
stereotyping rather than actual military assessments formed the
basis of the exclusion order. 90 In affirming the decision below, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said:
The Hirabayashi and Korematsu decisions have never
occupied an honored place in our history. In the ensuing
four and a half decades, journalists and researchers have
stocked library shelves with studies of the cases and
surrounding events. These materials document historical
judgments that the convictions were unjust. They
demonstrate that there could have been no reasonable
military assessment of an emergency at the time, that the
orders were based upon racial stereotypes, and that the
orders caused needless suffering and shame for thousands
of American citizens.91
Nevertheless, President Ford did not specifically apologize for
interning alien Japanese. No President has issued a proclamation
under the Enemy Aliens Act since the close of World War 11.92 The
disuse of the Enemy Aliens Act is notable given the fact that the
United States has been engaged in a number of armed conflicts over
the last half century. Yet, the federal government opposed vacating
Mr. Hirabayashi's conviction, which is the only reason the case could
reach the Court of Appeals. This shows the degree to which key
89. Proclamation No. 4417, 3 C.F.R. 8, 41 Fed. Reg. 35 (1977). See generally
Lobasso, supra note 87, at 54 (explaining that President Ford stated that
evacuation and detention were wrong, and that such action would never again be
repeated).
90. Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
91. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1987).
92. Proclamation No. 2685, 11 Fed. Reg. 4079 (April 11, 1946).
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questions relating to the treatment of enemy nationals remain
unresolved in American jurisprudence.
Yet the rule is challenged at its foundations by non-derogable
prohibitions on discrimination, and appears increasingly difficult to
justify in the context of contemporary armed conflict. Non-
discrimination is one the most fundamental principles of human
rights law, recognized in the opening articles of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. Equality is highlighted in the preamble of
the U.N. Charter and as one of the organization's purposes of
existence. 93 The 1945 London Agreement defining crimes against
humanity for the Nuremberg trials included non-discrimination
elements.9 4 Common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
included a non-discrimination provision. 95 Ian Brownlie argues that
the prohibition on racial discrimination is ajus cogens or preemptory
norm from which no state may absolve itself.96
For present purposes, the most important rules against
discrimination are set out in the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (hereinafter "CERD). 97 The CERD's
93. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., U.N. Doc A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
94. Charter of the IMT, supra note 20, art. 6(c) at 288 ("[P]ersecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds .... ").
95. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 ("Persons taking no active part in
hostilities . . . shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any
adverse distinction founds on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth,
or any other similar criteria.").
96. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 546-49 (Oxford
University Press 2003) (1966). See also Amoco Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Iran, 15 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189, 223 (1987-I) ("Discrimination is widely held as prohibited
by customary international law in the field of expropriation."); Case Concerning
the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Second Phase)
(Belg. v. Sp.) 1970 I.C.J. Rep. (1970), 4, 32 (holding that "protection from slavery
and racial discrimination" are preemptory norms of international law).
97. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. C, 95-2 (1978),
660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
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scope includes distinctions made on the basis of "national or ethnic
origin."98 Immigration remains a special area in which states are
permitted to make discriminatory distinctions that would otherwise
be prohibited. The CERD explicitly does not apply to distinctions
between citizens and non-citizens, 99 nor to provisions "concerning
nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that such
provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality."00
This last clause poses a serious challenge to the enemy nationals
rule, because the entire concept requires singling out a particular
nationality for disadvantage. Rather than distinguishing between
citizens and non-citizens, the enemy nationals rule distinguishes
between non-citizens. Given that the CERD contains no provision
allowing exceptions in times of emergency, this rule may override the
Fourth Geneva Convention's regulated authorization for restrictions
on the liberty of enemy nationals. There may be debate about
whether a general treaty such as the CERD can override the more
specific provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention. But, at a
minimum, the norm of non-discrimination strengthens arguments
that an enemy national may be detained only in the event of specific
individual reasons to consider the person dangerous.
A more conceptual challenge to the enemy nationals rule is
its highly formalistic conception of enemy identity. The enemy
nationals rule is rooted in a historical era in which civilian status
during warfare was bound up in the assumption that citizens are
inexorably linked to their sovereign governments. As I have already
discussed, this assumption was under serious attack by the
nineteenth century. In World War II, states came to recognize that
many people could be citizens of Germany and yet not supportive of
the German war effort. It would have been irrational to penalize
Jewish refugees and Nazi opponents for a Nazi-led war effort, but
that is exactly what a rigid application of the enemy nationals rule
would require. The enemy nationals concept is even more artificial in
the context of conflict with non-state organizations such as those
involved in the War on Terror. It makes little sense to presume
automatic loyalty between citizens and a sovereign government in a
conflict defined by the prominent role of non-state actors.
98. Id. art. 1 para. 1.
99. Id. art. 1 para. 2.
100. Id. art. 1 para. 3 (emphasis added).
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The 2006 war between Israel and Lebanon illustrates the
problem vividly. The war began when Hezbollah, a mainly Shiite
Muslim militia in Lebanon, attacked an Israeli army patrol inside
Israel and captured two soldiers, leading to a massive Israeli counter-
attack by air and land on Lebanon. Though the war was clearly
international in character, only one of the two main combatants was
a sovereign state. Israel did not allege that the Lebanese government
knew about the Hezbollah attack, and the Lebanese army did not
engage in any direct hostilities with Israel. Lebanon is a famously
factionalized country, where political groups like Hezbollah tend to
draw support only from particular segments, defined mainly by
religious sect. The weakness of the Lebanese state was in fact a
major issue in the war; one of Israel's major demands was that
Lebanon deploy troops up to the border with Israel and exert control
that had effectively been in the hands of non-state militias. In other
words, one of Israel's stated objectives was to strengthen the
government of the country with which it was at war. That is
essentially the opposite of what the protagonists of the two world
wars tried to accomplish. Legal doctrines defining enemy character
that are founded on the connections between sovereign governments
and their citizens do not fit easily in this context.
I have already noted that the weak linkage between formal
nationality and actual likelihood to support an enemy war effort
could lead one in two opposing directions. First, one could conclude
that there is no justification for taking harsh measures against a
group of people based solely on their nationality. Instead, states
should only take measures against specific individuals who pose a
security threat.10 ' I argue that this is in fact the approach required by
101. Lobasso argues:
[Tihe drafters of Geneva IV could have left the agreement in a
condition wherein an individual's mere status as an enemy
alien would allow the state to intern him, but the drafters did
not choose this course. Instead, insertion of Article 42 [allowing
internment only "if the security of the Detaining Power makes
it absolutely necessary"] makes it clear that being a national of
an enemy state alone is not a sufficient reason to justify
internment. There must be additional facts to indicate that
such a measure is "absolutely necessary." Similarly, a bare
assertion that the state is at war would not be sufficient
justification for an internment, because Geneva IVs provisions
all contemplate the existence of an international armed
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international human rights and humanitarian law, given the strong
guarantees against discrimination and the provisions of both the
Refugee Convention and the Fourth Geneva Convention requiring
individual hearings and assessments of each case.
However, one could also respond to the formalistic nature of
the enemy nationals rule by imposing even more extreme forms of
discrimination. Instead of basing harsh measures on formal
nationality alone, a state might instead restrict the rights of an
entire ethnic or religious group. A state might do this through an
explicit policy directed automatically against all members of a
particular group. Or a state might take a slightly less direct but still
discriminatory approach in which all members of a particular group
are suspected of potential disloyalty and then subject to surveillance
and scrutiny that would not fall on other people.
States are especially likely to take such steps when conflicts
are defined more by ethnicity, religion, and ideology than by fixed
sovereign borders. The current War on Terror is not the first global
conflict to shift focus away from enemy citizenship and toward enemy
ethnicity or ideology. In a recent article, Karen Engle notes that fear
of Communist infiltration led the U.S. Congress to pass measures
against Communist party members, regardless of whether they were
citizens of friendly or enemy states.
Although the foreign threat had its origins in an enemy
state (the Soviet Union), it could not be contained.
Sympathizers were part of a transnational organization,
and could potentially enter the United States from many
different countries. Thus, white Europeans, many from
countries whose nationals had long been admitted to the
United States, posed the threat. Neither the alien
infiltrators nor the citizens they successfully affected or
infected were easily identifiable.
Even before Congress passed measures directed specifically at
Communists, the United States had deported non-citizen residents
with Communist affiliations. The Supreme Court approved of such
action by making direct analogy to the enemy nationals concept, 10 3
conflict. The inclusion of Article 42 demonstrates that more is
needed in this regard as well.
Lobasso, supra note 87, at 62-63 (citations omitted).
102. Karen Engle, Constructing Good Aliens and Good Citizens: Legitimizing
the War on Terror(ism), 75 U. Colo. L. Rev. 59, 78 (2004).
103. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587 (1952) ("Though the
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illustrating how easily its logic can be adapted to justify infringing
the liberty of groups marked by criteria other than nationality.
III. MIDDLE EASTERN (MIS)USES OF THE ENEMY NATIONALS
CONCEPT
Though treaties enacted immediately after World War II
sharply curtailed the enemy nationals rule, what proved most
important in the emerging conflict in the Middle East was the simple
fact that the rule was not completely abolished. Directly and
indirectly, Israeli and Arab governments have used the enemy
nationals concept to justify discriminatory policies that lie at the
heart of the Middle East conflict. To be precise, Middle Eastern
governments did not utilize the enemy nationals rule per se; by the
1950s the legal rule itself was subject to too many limitations to
actually legitimize the types of policies that have been invoked
against Jews and Arabs. Instead, they used the underlying logic that
a person's formal identity alone can render him or her a threat and
hence justify infringing upon her liberty.
In the remainder of this article, I will outline the ways in
which Israel and selected Arab states have used or misused the
enemy nationals rule in ways that worsened the regional conflict.
Through this analysis, I will argue that there was a common
intellectual foundation underpinning Israeli policies that drove
Palestinians into exile and Arab policies that inflicted a similar
dispossession on Arab Jews. Yet linkage between the fates of
Palestinian refugees who fled from Israel and Jewish refugees who
fled from Arab countries is highly controversial. From the earliest
years of the State of Israel, Israeli leaders have on occasion argued
that the two migratory movements should be considered a population
exchange and that refugee property losses should be off-set against
each other.' °4 This position has been opposed by advocates for
resident alien may be personally loyal to the United States, if his nation becomes
our enemy his allegiance prevails over his personal preference and makes him
also our enemy."), discussed in Engle, supra note 102, at 80-81.
104. Lex Takkenberg, Status of Palestinian Refugee in International Law 16
(1998); see also Ruth Lapidoth, Do Palestinian Refugees Have a Right to Return to
Israel?, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jan. 15, 2001,
http://tinyurl.com/2p5qnv ("The [Security] Council did not propose a specific
solution, nor did it limit the provision to Arab refugees, probably because the
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Palestinian refugees,0 5 who have argued that there should be no
linkage between the exodus of Palestinians and of Arab Jews.
In recent years, legal historians have published detailed
histories of the development of Israeli law vis-A-vis Palestinian
refugees and their property. In addition to Israeli policies, I examine
the legal mechanisms used in Egypt and Iraq to put pressure on
Jewish citizens in the 1950s and 1960s. I chose Egypt and Iraq as
case studies because they are particularly large and influential Arab
states that had significant Jewish populations, and because there are
detailed published histories of what happened to the Jewish
communities in both countries. I am only drawing a thematic analogy
between Israeli, Egyptian, and Iraqi policies, arguing that they were
all supported by the ambiguities of the enemy nationals doctrine in
international law. This limited analogy in no way supports the
argument that the exile of Arab Jews justifies preventing Palestinian
refugees from returning to their homes inside Israel. First, as Jan
Abu Shakrah has noted, Arab states did not expel Jews in order to
make room for Palestinian refugees; °6 there was in fact no
agreement to carry out a population exchange.' 7 Second, although it
is not the topic of this article, serious doubts should be raised about
whether forced population exchanges can be legitimate in modern
human rights and humanitarian law.'0 8 Third, the Palestinians bear
right to compensation of Jewish refugees from Arab lands also deserves a 'just
settlement.'") (on file with Human Rights Law Review).
105. See, e.g., Jan Abu Shakrah, Deconstructing the Link: Palestinian
Refugees and Jewish Immigrants from Arab Countries, in Palestinian Refugees:
The Rights of Return 208 (Naseer Aruri ed., 2001).
106. Id. at 210, 212-13. It is also noteworthy that Israel refrained from
insisting on any agreement on population exchanges in peace treaties with Egypt
and Jordan.
107. However, I must disagree with Abu Shakrah's assertion that"emigration from Arab countries was voluntary and connected to events totally
unrelated to the 1948 war." Id. at 213. Although this was certainly true for some
individuals, and may be more accurate regarding some Arab states, it is not
supported by the historical studies I have reviewed regarding Jews from Egypt
and Iraq. As described in the text of this article, Egyptian and Iraqi Jews faced an
array of harsh and often discriminatory government measures, hostility and
occasional violence from fellow citizens, and a general climate of ethnic tension
and insecurity. These problems grew directly from the Arab-Israeli conflict.
108. See generally U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Subcomm. on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Freedom of Movement: Human
Rights and Population Transfer, E/CN.4ISub.2/1997/23 (June 27, 1997) (detailing
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no responsibility for the policies of other governments toward their
Jewish citizens. Only the fate of Jews from pre-1948 Palestine would
be relevant in bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization. I would argue that Palestinians are correct
to refuse any linkage between the two exile communities in the
negotiation of a remedy, but they are nevertheless theoretically
linked with reference to the enemy nationals concept.
A. Israeli policies toward Palestinian refugees and citizens of
Israel
At the beginning of 1948, the year of Israel's creation, Jews
were a minority in Mandate Palestine, a country that included the
lands that currently form the State of Israel and the occupied
Palestinian territories (West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza
Strip). By the end of the year, the country was remade politically and
demographically; Israel was established on approximately seventy-
eight percent of the territory, inside what is today called the "green
line," and approximately seventy-five percent of the non-Jewish
Palestinian population was displaced. Israel continues to insist
officially that Arab states bear the primary responsibility for the
Palestinian exodus. In the view of this author, there is now a
substantial and growing body of historical research-much of it
relying on Israel's own official archives-that makes clear that the
Palestinian refugee flight resulted primarily from fear of violence,
panic, and in many cases intentional measures by Israeli forces
aimed at driving away non-Jewish civilians. 09
the ways in which population transfers violate human rights and are prohibited
by international law where the consent of those transferred is absent).
109. See generally Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee
Problem Revisited (2004) (detailing events leading up to and causing different
waves of Palestinian exodus, including official Zionist policies and military
strategies that resulted in dispelling many remaining Arabs); All That Remains:
The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948 (Walid
Khalidi ed., 1992) (describing the circumstances surrounding the destruction of
418 Palestinian villages in the countryside, including the reasons for which
inhabitants fled). Although there is little debate about whether violence and fear
were the main causes of refugee flight, debate continues among historians over
the degree to which whether refugee flight was part of a systematic plan by
Israeli/Zionist leaders. Compare Morris, supra note 109, at 592-98 (arguing that
Israeli strategy against Arabs resulted in civilian flight, but was intended to
"harm and deter militiamen, not to precipitate an exodus") and Benny Morris,
Revisiting the Palestinian Exodus of 1948, in The War for Palestine: Rewriting
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The fewer than 200,000 Palestinians who remained inside
Israel after 1948 were placed under military rule until 1966. The
Defense (Emergency) Regulations prohibited them from moving
outside their areas without permits, and allowed military governors
to impose exile or arrest arbitrarily.' ° These measures bear direct
similarity to the American internment of Japanese because they
imposed severe restrictions on basic liberty explicitly according to
ethno-national lines, but were justified by vague security regulations
that were themselves facially neutral.
The legal status of the military rule that was imposed on
the Palestinian minority in October 1948 was grounded in
the mandatory emergency regulations the British had
issued in 1945 against the Jewish underground, which gave
military governors extended authority over the people
under their rule.... Political activists even vaguely
suspected of identifying with Palestinian nationalism were
expelled or imprisoned. 1
Similar to the case of the Japanese internment, retrospective
histories have created a fair amount of skepticism about whether
Israeli military rule over Arab citizens was really necessary even on
narrow security grounds. According to Ian Black and Benny Morris'
history of Israel's intelligence services, "Official monitoring of Arab
the History of 1948 37-56 (Eugene L. Rogan & Avi Schlaim eds., 2001) (arguing
that newly declassified Israeli government documents do not suggest any Zionist"master plan" to expel Palestinian Arabs), with Nur Masalha, A Critique on
Benny Morris, in The Israel/Palestine Question 211-20 (Ilan Pappe ed., 1999)
(arguing that Zionist plans to form an "exclusivist state" and address security
threats translated into plans for expulsion by 1948) and Nur Masalha, The
Politics of Denial: Israel and the Palestinian Refugee Problem 7-41 (2003)
(arguing that Zionist leaders long planned to expel or transfer Palestinians in
order to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish state); Rashid Khalidi, The
Palestinians and 1948: The Underlying Causes of Failure, in The War for
Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948 12-36 (Eugene L. Rogan & Avi Schlaim
eds., 2001) (examining internal weaknesses in Palestinian society that made
Palestinians vulnerable to pressures that led them to flee) and Ilan Pappe, Were
They Expelled?: The History, Historiography and Relevance of the Refugee
Problem, in The Palestinian Exodus 1948-1988 (Ghada Karni & Eugene Cortran
eds., 1999) (demonstrating that the divide between the Palestinian and Zionist
narratives on the cause of the Palestinian exodus has narrowed, with "new
historians" agreeing that Israel bore primary responsibility for the exodus and
pursued plans that made expulsion inevitable).
110. Ian J. Bickerton & Carla L. Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab-
Israeli Conflict 108 (3d ed. 1998).
111. Ilan Pappe, A History of Modern Palestine 155-56 (2004).
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activities [within Israel] had less to do with the danger of espionage
and sabotage than with the authorities' fear of political radicalism
among the minority.""12 Israel's domestic intelligence agency, Shin
Bet, initially used the military rule "to apply pressure to Arabs by
granting or withholding favours[,]"" 3 but by the late 1950s the Shin
Bet had come to see military rule as overly harsh and of limited
utility."14
A more vivid and longer-lasting impact of the enemy
nationals concept can be seen in Israel's treatment of the immovable
property that displaced Palestinians left behind in 1948. At the
beginning of the war, very little of Palestine was actually owned by
Jews or Jewish institutions.
[L]and officially owned by Jewish individuals and
organizations only amounted to approximately 8.5% of the
total area of the State. With the addition of land that was
owned formerly by the British Mandatory government and
thereby inherited by Israel, only about 13.5% (2.8 million
dunums; 700,000 hectares) of Israeli territory was under
State or Jewish ownership. Thus, a large discrepancy
existed between the sovereignty and control of land by the
Jewish State on one hand and its ownership and possession
on the other.115
Israel sought to correct this discrepancy by confiscating the property
left behind by the Palestinian refugees who left the country. As Israel
consolidated its military victory, it worked to create legal and
regulatory structures for confiscating property.16
From mid-1948 through 1950, Israel's confiscation policy was
repeatedly revised and redefined."' Property confiscations began ad
hoc in spring 1948 during the course of fighting,"8 but became more
formalized on June 21, 1948, with the Abandoned Property
Ordinance, which attempted to regularize seizures that were already
112. Ian Black & Benny Morris, Israel's Secret Wars 141 (1991).
113. Id. at 140.
114. See id. at 140, 166-67.
115. Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, The Legal Transformation of Ethnic
Geography: Israeli Law and the Palestinian Landholder 1948-1967, 33 Int'l L. &
Pol. 923, 945-46 (2001).
116. See Michael Fischbach, Records of Dispossession 14-18 (2003).
117. This legal history is taken id. at 14-26.
118. See id. at 14-15.
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taking place." 9 Three days later, the Abandoned Areas Ordinance
permitted confiscation of any land "conquered by or surrendered to
armed forces or deserted by all or part of its inhabitants."2 °
Israel's June 1948 focus on conquest as a legal criterion for
property confiscation was clearly rooted in the antiquated doctrine of
war booty, in which conquest alone was enough to justify seizing
property. This policy violated the Hague Regulations and likely fell
under the definition of "plunder" used at Nuremberg. However, in
December 1948 Israel revised its policy so as to make the owner's
identity more important than the land's vacancy or military
conquest. 12 ' Modeled after the 1939 British Trading with the Enemy
Act, these regulations allowed the Custodian of Absentee Property to
indefinitely seize and administer land, but not to acquire or transfer
title. 22 On March 14, 1950, the Knesset enacted the Absentees'
Property Law of 5710/1950, which solidified Israeli control over
refugee property in permanent legislation (rather than emergency
regulations).
A new amendment on March 15, 1951, permitted the
Custodian to sell land to the Development Authority.' 23 A separate
statute, the Development Authority (Transfer of Property) Law
(1950), allowed the Development Authority to sell either to the State
for general public use, or to the Jewish National Fund (JNF). By
1951, the Development Authority, the State, and the Jewish National
Fund held around ninety-two percent of all of the land in Israel. 24
These statutes established a legal means by which property owned by
Palestinian refugees could be first seized by the Custodian, and then
transferred for permanent use by Jewish institutions.
While the original 1948 Absentee Property Ordinance had
been based on a British model, the 1950 legislation was modeled on a
Pakistani legislative scheme that allowed property belonging to
Hindu and Sikh refugees to be reallocated to Muslim refugees from
India.125 In the Pakistani system, a Custodian of Evacuee Property
119. See No. 12 of 5708/1948 (enacted June 21, 1948), quoted in Fischbach,
supra note 116, at 18.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 21.
122. See Kedar & Forman, supra note 1, at 815.
123. See Fischbach, supra note 116, at 23-26.
124. See Kedar & Forman, supra note 1, at 823; Fischbach, supra note 116, at
23-26.
125. See id. at 816.
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was authorized to transfer property to a Rehabilitation Authority
that could then transfer land to others. 26 Israeli Government officials
told the Knesset that the Custodian of Absentee Property would be
acting to safeguard refugee property, and would behave as a
trustee.' 27 But the legislation actually allowed the Custodian to
surrender control of the property. Instead of holding refugee property
in anticipation of a peace settlement, Israel transferred it for the
benefit of Israeli Jews, without any provision for the property to be
preserved for its original owners' benefit.
Just as British laws had defined "enemy character" by a
person's residence, even if temporary, Israel defined "absentee" by a
person's residence in territory controlled by any of the Arab armies
with which it fought. By defining the confiscations based on the
owners' purported connection with Arab states and their armed
forces, Israel followed (at least in form) accepted precedents about the
treatment of enemy civilian property.' 2' This mechanism allowed
Israel's custodian to claim property belonging to Palestinian refugees,
not just citizens of other Arab states.
Although the Israeli legislation was facially neutral in terms
of ethnic or religious identity, in practice, Jewish-owned property was
exempted from confiscation.'2 9 The Israeli law included special
exceptions allowing the Custodian to exempt absentees who left their
homes for fear of Israel's enemies, or who were "capable of managing
their property efficiently without aiding Israel's enemies."' 30 In
addition to this discrimination, Israel's law was too over-inclusive to
logically match the formal rationale of the enemy nationals doctrine.
Israel's definition of an absentee included people who traveled
126. See id.
127. See id. at 817.
128. See Fischbach, supra note 116, at 22 (noting that South Asian policies
toward land left behind by Muslims in India and Hindus in Pakistan and the
British Trading with the Enemy Ordinance were used as models).
129. See Kedar & Forman, supra note 1, at 815 ("In fact, [the absentee
definition] was so all encompassing that it included most residents of Israel-
Jews and Arabs alike. Israel, however, had no intentions of applying this status
to Jews, so the regulations contained a clause by which Jews could be
systematically exempted, without incorporating explicitly discriminating
provisions.") (citations omitted).
130. Fischbach, supra note 116, at 25 ("Jewish absentees owning property in
Israel were treated differently from Arabs. The custodian generally released to
them any property they owned in Israel upon their immigration to Israel. On
other occasions, such land was released to their representatives.").
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outside the Middle East, not just to countries that fought with Israel.
It also included Arabs who were actually residing inside Israeli
territory but whose homes had briefly fallen under the control of
Arab armies; this is peculiar since their assets could not any longer
be easily used by any enemy state. 31 Under British policy the "enemy
character" of the internally displaced would likely have ended when
the enemy army lost control of the territory on which they were
residing (i.e. when Israeli forces conquered their new places of
residence), although this rule was still subject to some ambiguity.13 2
This over-breadth and discrimination supports arguments
that Israel followed the enemy property doctrine only in form. Its
policies are better understood as an application of the war booty
doctrine, where conquest by Jewish forces alone effectively led to
permanent dispossession. Instead of holding refugee property in
anticipation of a peace settlement, Israel transferred it for the benefit
of Israeli Jews without any provision for the property to be preserved
for its original owners' benefit. The enemy nationals concept hence
facilitated a practice that international law had sought to ban
decades earlier by providing a formal mechanism by which non-Jews
could be labeled enemies (or in the Israeli legislation, "absentees").
B. Iraqi policies toward Jews
Iraq provides one of the most vivid examples of an Arab state
using legislation to pressure its Jewish citizens to such an extent that
most fled the country; the legislation was purportedly justified by a
security rationale during war with Israel. Iraq was home to between
125,000 and 160,000 Jews in 1950, and had seen incidents of anti-
Jewish violence and discrimination during World War 11.133 Iraq's
government was fragile, and the army that it sent to Palestine in
1948 was defeated. Throughout the first half of 1948 the country was
torn by riots that nearly toppled the regime, fed by economic woes
and anti-British sentiment, along with anti-Zionism. 34 Historian
131. Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 33, at 300. See also Fischbach, supra
note 1166, at 23 (quoting a Knesset member objecting that "[wie are not dealing
with enemy property, but with the property of a substantial part of the population
of our country.").
132. See McNair & Watts, supra note 34, at 22.
133. See Carole Basri, The Jewish Refugees from Arab Countries: An
Examination of Legal Rights-A Case Study of the Human Rights Violations of
Iraqi Jews, 26 Fordham Int'l L.J. 656, 659-75 (2003).
134. See Moshe Gat, The Jewish Exodus from Iraq 1948-1951 33-34 (1997).
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Moshe Gat describes the beginnings of state discrimination against
Jews in terms very similar to the historical origins of the American
internment of Japanese just a few years earlier, with a regime torn
by a desire to prevent vigilante attacks on Jews and a political need
not to seem too solicitous of a minority popularly perceived as an
enemy.
The Iraqi government adopted several limited measures to
protect Jewish life and property from extremist elements....
Reinforced police units patrolled the streets of the capital
and particularly the Jewish quarters. But as far as the
regime was concerned, the defense of Jewish life and
property at a time when the forces of Iraq and its Arab
brethren were fighting the Zionist state was liable to arouse
angry reactions among pan-Arab elements... [Ilt was
essential for the government to adopt a policy which would
prevent extremist circles from organizing anti-Jewish riots,
on the one hand, and would protect the Jewish community
in general, on the other. Making every effort to maintain its
ascendancy, the government chose a policy of controlled
oppression and anti-Jewish discrimination. 135
Beginning in November 1947 (when the U.N. General
Assembly recommended the partition of Palestine), Iraq's
government imposed an escalating series of measures specifically
against Jews. These began with a ban on foreign travel without
payment of a bond and prior government approval. 136 Jews were
prohibited from selling property, but were permitted to submit
property as a bond for travel. This allowed many to travel but also
began a process of dispossession. 137 The government pressured the
Jewish community to make "donations" or "loans" to support Iraq's
war effort, and Jews were often subject to arbitrary fines to support
both the war and government corruption. 13 According to Abbas
Shiblak, the outbreak of war in Palestine eroded the popular
distinction in the Iraqi nationalist press between Judaism and
Zionism. 39 Shiblak reports that in November 1948 the Iraqi Ministry
of Foreign Affairs told the U.S. Department of State that the main
object of martial law was to fight Communism and Zionism, though it
135. Id. at 34-35.
136. Id. at 35.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 35-36.
139. Abbas Shiblak, The Lure of Zion: The Case of the Iraqi Jews 67-68
(1986).
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also implied that many Jews were Communists and directly
analogized Iraq's treatment of Jews to Israel's treatment of Arabs.'40
Anti-Jewish measures worsened following elections on June
15, 1948. In July, the Iraqi Parliament passed a law criminalizing
Zionist activity; punishments ranged from seven years imprisonment
to death and the testimony of two Muslim witnesses could support a
conviction.14' In August, the Iraqi Government declared that any Jew
who had left Iraq since 1939 and had not returned would be
considered to have defected to the enemy, subject to trial in abstentia
by a military tribunal.' 42 By the end of the year, Jewish banks were
closed and Jewish civil servants dismissed from state employment. A
number of Jews were arrested and subjected to rapid military trials
on accusations of aiding Israel or Zionism, most prominently Shafiq
Ades, a wealthy executive with the Ford Motor Company who was
arrested in August, tried for three days in September, and hung in
public on September 23.143
However, the escalation in pressure on the Jewish
community waned as the war wound down in late 1948. Toward the
end of the year, the Iraqi Government tried to articulate a legitimate
explanation for its policies. After the departure of a highly anti-
Jewish defense minister, the Iraqi Prime Minister told Parliament
that not all Jews were Zionists and emphasized that Jews were
entitled to equal rights.' 44 The government's measures, he asserted,
were aimed at Zionist supporters, whatever their religion or race.141
At an international level, such softened rhetoric seemed to produce
results. When British Jews asked the Foreign Office to intervene on
behalf of Iraqi Jews, the British Government demurred. According to
Gat, citing Foreign Office communications, the British had a number
of reasons for avoiding intervention, including a fear of antagonizing
Arab Governments that had just suffered military defeat. However,
the British Government also appeared to view the Iraqi
Government's policy as reasonable and restrained under the
circumstances.' 46 One British diplomat wrote that it would be
difficult to support "people who are doubtless widely regarded in Iraq
140. Id. at 70.
141. Gat, supra note 134, at 36.
142. Id. at 37.
143. Id at 37-39.
144. Id. at 40-41.
145. Id. at 41.
146. Id. at 44-46.
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as fifth columnists." 147 Though the British were aware of anti-Jewish
discrimination, diplomats credited the Iraqi Government with
avoiding mass anti-Jewish violence.148
After a year of relative calm, developments late in 1949 set
off a rapid chain of events that led to the near-total exodus of the
Iraqi Jewish community by 1951. Martial law remained in force, and
with it the anti-Jewish restrictions on travel and property sales. In
October, Iraqi police uncovered an underground Zionist organization
in Iraq, supported by Israeli intelligence, that was collecting arms
and smuggling Jews out of the country. 49 Widespread arrests
produced allegations of torture and mistreatment, and the Israeli
Government appealed to both the United States and the United
Kingdom to pressure Iraqi authorities to end the crackdown. 5 ° The
American and British Governments viewed Israeli complaints as
exaggerated and self-serving, and viewed the arrests as a legitimate
campaign against foreign subversion.' 5' Whereas in 1948 the British
had avoided confronting genuinely racist laws, Iraqi actions in 1949
were far less discriminatory, and much more focused on actual
members of the underground. 5 2 But the arrests sparked a crisis
nonetheless because the Zionist underground mobilized the Jewish
community in protests and boycotts. 53
In 1950, the Iraqi Parliament passed the Ordinance for the
Cancellation of Iraqi Nationality for Jews, Law No. 1 of 1950 (March
4, 1950).' 1 4 The ordinance had the effect of easing Jews into exile,
offering an exemption from the travel ban to a community under
severe pressure. Under the ordinance, a Jew could leave Iraq if he or
she signed a form renouncing Iraqi citizenship. Within a year, at
least 85,893 people registered. 5 Exiles were allowed to take only a
small amount of clothing and jewelry out of the country. 56 Then, on
147. Id. at 45.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 51-52.
150. Id. at 53.
151. Id. at 55-56.
152. Id. at 56-57.
153. Id. at 58-66.
154. Basri, supra note 133, at 680.
155. Id. at 682. However, there appear to be no uniform figures in historical
studies. Gat states that more than 105,000 Jews registered, though most
remained in the country. Gat, supra note 134, at 144.
156. Id.
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March 10, 1951, the Iraqi government enacted two new measures,
Law No. 5 of 1951 and Regulation No. 3 of 1951, which confiscated
property from any Jew who renounced Iraqi citizenship. 57 By these
legal tools, Iraqi Jews were effectively pressured out of the country
and simultaneously dispossessed of their property. 15 8
Shiblak maintains that Law No. 1 of 1950 was enacted under
British and American pressure to ease emigration, and that the Iraqi
Government did not know it would lead to the mass exodus of
Jews. 5 9 He notes that at first Iraq did not confiscate the property of
departing Jews, although in 1950 British diplomats urged Iraqi
officials to study Israeli treatment of "property left behind by the
Arab refuges." Iraq initially resisted the temptation to match those
policies. 60 According to Shiblak, the British and American hesitancy
to protest the Iraqi moves stemmed in part from their knowledge that
Israel had confiscated vast amounts of Arab property.'61
Of all the case studies examined in this article, the Iraqi
treatment of Jews involved the most explicit and open targeting of a
single ethnic or religious group. Both the legal foundations for
American policies toward Japanese, Israeli treatment of Palestinians,
and (as we will see) Egyptian policies toward Jews were all for the
most part facially neutral, though highly discriminatory in practice.
But because the Iraqi case was so extreme, both on its face and in the
rapidity of the Jewish exodus, it further illustrates how easily the
enemy nationals concept can be used politically to legitimize very
troubling policies. Jews were seen as linked to the enemy (Israel)
based on their ethnicity alone; citizenship was irrelevant. But British
diplomats could nevertheless advise Iraq's government to use Israeli
laws as a template to justify confiscating Jewish property. The Israeli
laws were themselves a distortion of British precedents and of the
actual international legal norms.
157. Basri, supra note 133, at 683.
158. Id. at 683-84. In 2005, the provisional Iraqi Government permitted all
previously denationalized Iraqis, including Jews, to vote in parliamentary
elections and effectively reclaim their citizenship. Cynthia Johnston, Could
Israeli Jews Vote in Iraq's election? Reuters, Jan. 19, 2005, at 1; Ramit Plushnick-
Masti, Israeli-Iraqis Have the Right to Vote, Associated Press Online, Jan. 13,
2005, at 1.
159. Shiblak, supra note 139, at 88.
160. Id. at 89.
161. Id. at 90.
2007]
HeinOnline -- 38 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 301 2006-2007
302 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [38:263
C. Egyptian policies toward Jews
Like their Iraqi counterparts, Egyptian Jews suffered from a
government clampdown during the first two decades of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Yet, whereas in Iraq the State passed laws that were
explicitly targeted at Jews, the Egyptian state's reaction was more
complicated. The U.N. Partition Recommendation of November 29,
1947, and the May 15, 1948, entry of Egypt into the Israel/Palestine
war sparked two sets of actions that put pressure on the Egyptian
Jewish community. The first consisted of anti-Jewish violence by
private organizations, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, and
inflammatory writing in the press. The second was a series of more
ambiguous actions by the Egyptian state. The State portrayed itself
as clamping down on sedition, while simultaneously trying to head
off racist vigilantism from the public. Epitomizing this ambiguity, an
Egyptian diplomat warned before the U.N. partition resolution that
"if Arab blood is shed in Palestine, Jewish blood will necessarily be
shed elsewhere in the world despite all the sincere efforts of the
governments concerned to prevent such reprisals."' 62
A dozen Jewish homes in Cairo were bombed on June 20,
1948, killing 22.163 On July 15, after an Israeli warplane reportedly
bombed Cairo, rioters attacked a Jewish neighborhood; police
arrested Jewish youths from a self-defense organization and the
district was looted. 1M A few days later, an explosion at a Jewish-
owned department store killed several people.' 65 Several more
buildings in the Jewish quarter of Cairo were bombed on September
22, killing 19, followed by riots and looting of Jewish businesses.' 66
Early in May 1948, King Faruq declared that most Jews were loyal
Egyptians and that action would be taken only against Zionists. 167
This was actually a change of policy, since Zionism had been"considered quasi-legal or had been tolerated" until 1948.168
The legal instruments that led to the greatest insecurity
among Jews were born in the middle of May 1948 when Egypt's army
entered Palestine. The King imposed martial law on May 14.
162. Michael M. Laskier, The Jews of Egypt 1920-1970 126 (1992).
163. Id. at 133.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 135.
167. Id. at 126.
168. Id.
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Egyptian authorities quickly detained around 1300 people, around
one thousand of them Jews who had been associated with Zionism. 169
Proclamation No. 26 of 30 May 1948 allowed authorities to sequester
the property of any person interned in Egypt or residing outside the
country whose activities were considered "prejudicial to the safety
and security of the state." 7 ° Indeed, "[firom the end of May 1948 until
early 1949 (particularly while Egypt and Israel were still at war)
significant Jewish private, commercial and communal assets were
seized and placed under the custody of the director-general of
sequestered property." 7 ' Hence, the Egyptian government gave itself
legal tools very similar to those utilized in Israel against
Palestinians.
Nevertheless, Egyptian official policies were more nuanced
than either their Israeli or Iraqi counterparts in that most did not
explicitly single out Jews, at least in the early years. It is clear that
the Egyptian state used the war with Israel to expand unchecked
repressive police power, that harsh measures fell disproportionately
on Jews, and that Zionist political affiliations were enough to render
a person a perceived threat to the state.' Historical accounts are
ambiguous about whether the Egyptian state's harshest measures
were anti-Jewish, mainly anti-Zionist, or simply a crackdown on all
political opposition. 171
[Tihough the Jews did become victimized as a result of the
Palestine war, they were by no means the only victims....
[Wihereas Zionists and non-Zionists were harassed by the
authorities, the severe political measures adopted by Egypt
were equally, if not more so, part of a policy to crack down
on the opposition forces ranging from the communists to the
Muslim Brotherhood.174
However, while internment and sequestration laws were not
exclusive to Jews, Egyptian authorities took other severe measures
that were targeted specifically at Jews. Jews with dual nationality
were pressured to leave the country with just a few hours notice. 75
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 126-27.
172. Id. at 130.
173. Id. at 129.
174. Id. at 130-31.
175. Id. at 130.
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Jewish gatherings were forbidden and Jewish communal
organizations were compelled to supply the names and
addresses of their membership.... During the summer of
1948 as many as thirty Jewish families were evicted each
week from their homes in those parts of Cairo within a
radius of one kilometer of King Faruq's residence or places
he frequented.176
While several thousand Jews did leave Egypt immediately after the
1948 war, Egypt did not see a mass exodus of the kind experienced in
Iraq in the early 1950s. 17 7 Egyptian Jewish life remained relatively
stable even through the July 1952 "Free Officers" revolution, though
Egyptian authorities maintained tight surveillance on Zionist
underground organizations.1 78
The period of relative calm ended in 1954.179 Beginning in
1951, Israeli intelligence had organized small groups of Egyptian
Jews into cells of saboteurs.8 ° In 1954, they placed explosives at
several Western-oriented civilian locations in Alexandria and Cairo
in an attempt to disrupt Egypt's relations with Britain and France.' 8 1
Egyptian police arrested many of the underground members, and
several were hanged after military trials.8 2
During the 1956 Suez War, the new Egyptian regime invoked
a "state of siege," permitted by Emergency Law No. 533 of 1954,
authorizing the military government to detain anyone who"prejudices public order and security."'8 3 Hundreds of Jews were
interned, and nearly all of the Jews of Cairo and Alexandria were
confined to their homes for long periods.'8 4 A separate law allowed for
the confiscation of property belonging to any person placed under
surveillance or internment.'85 While none of these measures
specifically named Jews, they imposed severe hardship on the Jewish
community.
The persons and firms affected by this measure represented
the bulk of the economic substance of Egyptian Jewry, the
176. Id.
177. Id. at 146.
178. Id. at 199-205.
179. Id. at 205-36.
180. Id. at 207-08.
181. Id. at 209-12
182. Id. at 214-16; id. at 236.
183. Id. at 253-54.
184. Id. at 254.
185. Id.
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largest and most important enterprises, and the main
sustenance, through voluntary contributions, of the Jewish
religious, educational, social and welfare institutions in
Egypt. The resulting paralysis of these institutions
substantially aggravated the uprooting effect of the
government's anti-Jewish policies and greatly intensified
the pressure for Jews to leave the country.
In form, the confiscated property was only temporarily sequestered
and was handed over to a commissioner to hold it in the interim. Yet
Egyptian legislation allowed the commissioner to deduct ten percent
of all income and capital that came under his control. 8 7
Internment and property confiscations were preludes to more
direct measures aimed at forcing Jews out of Egypt. By the end of
November 1956, around 500 Jewish families, both Egyptian and
stateless, had received direct orders of expulsion requiring them to
exit the country within a week.1 8 8 Another harsh measure was
Egyptian nationality law, which had been enacted in 1950 and then
amended in September 1956 by decree of President Gamal Abdel
Nasser. The revised nationality law strictly defined an "Egyptian" as
a person who did not fall under the jurisdiction of a foreign state and
who was "resident on Egyptian territory before 1 January 1900," and
who had maintained his or her residence continuously ever since.18 9
This was used by Egyptian authorities to denationalize any person
who could not prove their families had been resident in 1900 (which
few Egyptians could prove), or who had traveled abroad even
briefly.' 90 In addition, the law explicitly prohibited "Zionists" from
Egyptian nationality, without defining the term.' 9' The State stopped
issuing direct expulsion orders after November, but adopted other
forms of pressure on Jews to induce them to leave "voluntarily."
Departing Jews received laissez-passer documents that prohibited
their return and renounced all claims against Egypt.' 92 More than
20,000 left from November 1956 to June 1957. By 1958, around
fourty percent of the Egyptian Jews had left.' 93
186. Id. at 255.
187. Id. at 256.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 257.
190. Id. at 261.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 256.
193. Id.
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The military order allowing property confiscation was
cancelled in April 1957.194 Up to this point, Egyptian law had not
been explicitly anti-Jewish; it mentioned Zionism, but not Jews
specifically. This changed in 1958, when Egypt briefly joined in a
political union with Syria. On April 15, 1958, the Minister of Interior
published a decree explicitly prohibiting "Jews" resident in Egypt
who left the country or denationalized from ever returning. 95 By the
time of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, there were only about 2,500 Jews
left in Egypt, 196 down from close to 80,000 in the 1940s.' 9' A week
after the beginning of the 1967 war, Egyptian police arrested 425
Jewish males. 9
Until September 19, 1968, Jews who had not been
imprisoned were permitted to leave the country once they
had renounced Egyptian citizenship and pledged never to
return.... By the end of 1968, only one thousand Jewsremained.199
On September 19, 1968, Egyptian authorities seemed to reverse
policy and actually prevented boats with Jewish emigrees from
leaving the country.2 0 Though people continued to leave quietly, "as
late as [June 15,1 1970, Jews could leave for Europe only if they could
confirm that they were dependent on a prisoner already released and
out of the country."20 1 Some of the men imprisoned in June 1967
remained jailed until September 1970, when they were finally
expelled from the country.20 2
There are therefore conflicting interpretations about why
nearly all Egyptian Jews eventually left the country. Historian Joel
Beinin explains that even as events were unfolding there were two
narratives of the pressure placed on the Egyptian Jewish community
in the 1950s.3 While Egyptian officials portrayed their prosecution
of accused Zionist militants as a routine action against espionage and
sabotage,2 °3 Israel and American Jewish organizations compared
194. Id. at 262.
195. Id. at 265.
196. Id. at 290.
197. Id. at 7.
198. Id. at 290.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 291.
201. Id. at 293.
202. Id.
203. Joel Beinin, The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry 90-102 (1998).
204. Id. at 99-102.
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them to Nazi tactics.205 Beinin argues that the Israeli version largely
held sway with western powers. °6 This was in part because Egyptian
and Arab nationalists often linked Zionism with Communism, which
appeared similar to Nazi propaganda that asserted Jews supported
an international Communist conspiracy.0 7 Western support also
grew from Egyptian propaganda that stressed the Jewish defendants'
western and cosmopolitan appearance. 20 8 Nevertheless, both the
British and American governments avoided making any formal
protests with the Egyptian authorities.2 9
That there were two narratives explaining the Jewish
situation in Egypt can be explained by the way in which Egyptian
policy evolved. At least at first, Egyptian policies could be explained
solely by security considerations, though they fell hardest on Jews.
The Egyptian state targeted political opposition, especially Zionism,
and hence may have violated its citizens' civil and political rights.
But as the 1950s wore on, Egyptian policies became increasingly
directed at Jews alone. This represents a shift from two different
incarnations of the enemy nationals policy. The first conceived of an
enemy political opinion (Zionism) that was tied to an enemy state
(Israel), and was analogous to American restrictions on Communists
regardless of their nationality. The second conceived of an enemy
religious group, and was analogous to American policies toward
Japanese.
Egyptian laws were similar to Israeli measures used against
Palestinians, in that they did not single out a minority group by
name, but instead used plausibly security-related criteria to justify
policies that nevertheless led to the disenfranchisement of an entire
community. This pattern continued even after most of the Jews had
departed. Egypt's 1975 Nationality Law bans "Zionists" (undefined)
from Egyptian citizenship.2"0 The same law allows the state to strip
any Egyptian of their citizenship if "he was described of being a
Zionist at any time" or "[hie worked for a State or foreign government
205. Id. at 91-99.
206. Id. at 102-03.
207. Id. at 100.
208. Id. at 103.
209. Id. at 103-04.
210. Tarek Badawy & Abdallah Khalil, Rights of Foreigners and Access to
Citizenship, Africa Citizenship and Discrimination Audit: The Case Study of
Egypt 35 (American University in Cairo Forced Migration and Refugee Studies)
(report pending publication, May 2005).
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at war with Egypt, or with whom diplomatic ties have been cut, and
his work could negatively affect the military, diplomatic, or economic
position of the country or jeopardize any other national interest.
"211
D. Israeli immigration and asylum policy
Since 2000, Israel has developed two new applications of the
enemy nationals concept, both involving foreigners and migration.
The first and most explicit involves asylum law. Israel has no asylum
legislation, but has been a party to the 1951 Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees since 1954.212 In 2001, the Attorney General
adopted a procedural mechanism by which refugees fleeing
persecution may seek asylum.2 13 Normally, refugees who are
recognized through this procedure receive one-year renewable
residence permits, which entitle them to work and enjoy social
security benefits on the same basis as Israeli citizens. But the
procedure includes a critical exception that effectively excludes
nationals of most states in Israel's immediate vicinity. Section 6 of
the Attorney General's procedure provides:
The State of Israel reserves the right, not to absorb into
Israel, or to grant a permit to enable the stay in Israel, of
subjects of enemy or hostile states-as determined from
time to time by the relevant authorities, and for as long as
such states possess that status. The issue of the release of
such persons on bail will be examined on a case-by-case
basis, in accordance with the prevailing circumstances, and
security considerations. 214
The author of this study is a lawyer in Tel Aviv University's
Refugee Rights Clinic, which by April 2006 had represented more
than fifty refugees from Sudan, Iran, the occupied Palestinian
211. Id. at 39.
212. Israel has also ratified the Refugee Convention's 1967 Protocol. United
Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights, States Parties to the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol,
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/protectopendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION
&id=3b73b0d63.
213. See generally Anat Ben-Dor & Rami Adut, Physicians for Human
Rights/Tel Aviv University Public Interest Law Resource Center, Israel: A Safe
Haven? Problems in the Treatment Offered by the State of Israel to Refugees and
Asylum Seekers (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.phr.org.il/phr/
files/articlefile_1108318126083.pdf.
214. Id. at 70 (citing Internal Directive, Ministry of the Interior, Regulations
Regarding the Treatment of Asylum Seekers in Israel (Aug. 22, 2001)).
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Territories,21 5 and elsewhere who were subject to this policy. In
practice, Section 6 allows refugees to be detained indefinitely when
people in the same circumstances of another nationality would be
released and in most cases granted a temporary work permit while
their cases were pending. By the end of March, at least 160 Sudanese
had been detained in Israel, many of these refugees from Darfur.
Although court petitions in a handful of cases had led the State to
agree to less stringent forms of detention (usually house arrest on a
kibbutz or collective farm), no Israeli court has yet ruled on the
legality of Section 6.
Israel's enemy nationals exclusion in asylum is notable
because it puts Israel in direct violation of Article 44 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, an article that Israel sponsored in 1949. Israel's
change of heart after 1949 was signaled by its 1954 reservation to the
Refugee Convention's article 8 (which exempts refugees from
exceptional measures defined by nationality). The legal significance
of this reservation is marginal; Israel is still bound by the Refugee
Convention's article 3 (prohibiting discrimination by country of
origin), the Fourth Geneva Convention's article 44, and the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
But the reservation to the Refugee Convention adds an element of
confusion about Israel's obligations that helps to detract from the
explicit terms of other bodies of law.
A more legally plausible invocation of the enemy nationals
doctrine concerns a ban, in place since 2002, on granting any
residency status to Palestinians from the West Bank or Gaza Strip.1 6
Under a 2005 amendment, the law targets family unity immigration
in which Israelis marry Palestinians and then seek their immigration
215. Israel also excludes Palestinians via a strained reading of the 1951
Convention's article 1(D). Refugee Convention, supra note 78, art. 1(D)at 137
(excluding from the benefits of the Convention persons receiving protection or
assistance from any UN agency or organ not the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees).
216. In March 2002 the Minister of Interior ordered his Ministry to not
accept new requests for family unification from Palestinians, a decision ratified
on December 5, 2002, by the Israeli government. See Decision no. 1813. The
Knesset (Parliament) then enacted the ban into formal legislation in 2003.
Nationality and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Order) (published in official
gazette Aug. 6, 2003). The original legislation applied to all Palestinians and was
initially valid for only one year, but was extended three times. The Knesset then
enacted an amended version of the law that went into effect on its publication in
the official gazette on August 1, 2005.
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to Israel. The exclusion applies to men under thirty-five years of age
and women under twenty-five, and exempts children if their parents
live legally in Israel. It was challenged by Israeli human rights
organizations both in U.N. bodies and in Israel's High Court.
By singling out a particular nationality for disadvantage in
immigration law, Israel violated the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination article 1(3), and has been
subject to corresponding criticism by the U.N. Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination.217 In response, Israel argued to
the U.N. committee that the measure is "a security oriented law, the
result of the wave of atrocious and indiscriminate Palestinian
terrorism," and claimed that family unification involving
Palestinians from the occupied territories had contributed to "23
murderous terrorist attacks."218 In its submissions to the U.N., Israel
offered only a partial defence of the legality of the entry restrictions,
noting that the law was temporary and subject to both a court
petition and possible amendment.2 9 But in 2005, Israel defended the
exclusion of Palestinians to its own High Court by explicitly invoking
the enemy nationals doctrine, arguing that many democracies refuse
immigration to citizens of enemy states in times of war. In a brief
filed on November 6, 2005, the State argued that international law
permitted treating all Palestinians as enemies because "Israel is in
an armed conflict with the Palestinian Authority and a large
proportion of the civilian population supports the conflict and even
takes part in it." 220
In May 2006, in Adalah v. Minister of Interior, an eleven-
judge panel of the High Court temporarily upheld the law in a closely
divided ruling that left the future of Israel's enemy nationals policies
217. CERD Decision 1(63), CERD/C/63/Dec.1. (2003) (calling for the
revocation of the law); CERD Decision 2(63), CERD/C/63/Dec.2. (2003)
(expressing concern at the renewal of the law); CERD Decision 2(65),
CERD/C/65/Dec.2. (2004) (same).
218. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Reports submitted
by states parties under article 9 of the Convention, para. 284, U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/47 1Add.2 (June 23, 2005).
219. Id. at paras. 285-86.
220. HCJ 7052/03, 7102/03, 7642/03, 7643/03, 8099/03, 8263/03, 10650/03,
Abdalah v. Minister of the Interior [2006] (not yet published), additional State
Response at para. 56.
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in continuing doubt.2 2 ' The majority decision by Justice Michael
Cheshin, signed by five justices, cited the enemy nationals rule
extensively in holding that Israel's armed conflict with the
Palestinians justified restricting migration by Palestinians.222 The
Court's President, Aharon Barak, wrote a lengthy dissent-also
signed by five justices-in which he argued that the law should be
struck down as a disproportionate violation of equality and family
life, and that individual security checks should be used instead.223
Cheshin referenced international law extensively. He argued
that "international law assumes that in times of war citizens of
warring states become enemies to each other and that every citizen
has a natural loyalty to his country of origin and will be hostile to its
"224enemies. Though this rationale is strongly tied to traditional
notions of the relationship between citizens and sovereign states, he
argued that it applied equally in cases of conflict with non-state
entities. 5 Cheshin argued that individual security checks would not
address the threat posed by Palestinians because they might become
dangerous after having been admitted to Israel.226 Adopting
arguments that had originally been submitted by the state, Cheshin
suggested that all Palestinians have the potential for terrorism
because a Palestinian who is not dangerous today may become so
tomorrow. He reasoned that people who enter Israel might change
their ideology later or be coerced to participate in terror by pressure
on their immediate families left behind. "Even if we can ascertain at
a given moment that a person is not involved in terror, how could we
be sure that tomorrow, after he will get the permit he wants, he
would not take part in terror?" he wrote.227 Because of this
uncertainty, Cheshin found the infringement of human rights
justified.
I agree that a collective violation has negative and
oppressive results, and that a democratic country should try
to refrain from this. However, I think, that sometimes it is
221. HCJ 7052/03, 7102/03, 7642/03, 7643/03, 8099/03, 8263/03, 10650/03
Adalah v. Minister of the Interior [decision dated May 14, 2006] (not yet
published).
222. Id.
223. Id. (Barak, J., dissenting)
224. Id. at para. 79.
225. Id. at para. 80.
226. Id. at para. 109.
227. Id. at para. 110.
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unavoidable. This is especially true when it is impossible to
trace and identify the few who wish to harm, while the
potential harm from them is very severe.... When the
offence of the few is so severe, it justifies collective
restrictions. 2
28
Cheshin's willingness to consider all Palestinians potentially
dangerous attracted sharp criticism from dissenting judges. Referring
to the Korematsu decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Ayala
Procaccia wrote, "We have to be weary of the danger of stigmatizing a
whole community by saying they are all a potential security risk."229
Justice Salim Joubran argued the law violated the rights of the
entire Arab population of Israel by envisioning them all as potential
threats. But Cheshin and others brushed the analogy aside, noting
the factual differences in the cases. Whereas the U.S. had interned
its own citizens, Israel was simply preventing the entry of foreign
citizens, in a situation where Palestinians posed a danger that was
much less speculative than that posed by Japanese Americans.2 3 °
In the lead dissent, Justice Barak conceded that there was a
rational connection between the ban on Palestinian entry and the
State's goal of enhancing security2 3 1 and that an across-the-board ban
on Palestinians is more effective than individual screening.232 But he
concluded that the resulting rights violations were out of proportion
to the actual security threat.233 He wrote:
Democracy does not impose a sweeping prohibition, dividing
its citizens from their spouses and making it impossible for
them to conduct family life; democracy does not impose a
sweeping prohibition that leaves its citizens with the option
to live in the state without the spouse or leave the state in
order to conduct family life; democracy does not impose a
sweeping prohibition that separates parents from their
children.2
3
With five justices signing both Cheshin and Barak's opinions, the
decisive vote was cast by Justice Edmond Levy, who wrote that he
agreed with Justice Barak on the substantive issues. He wrote that
228. Id. at. para. 115.
229. Id. at para 21 (Procaccia, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at para. 22 (Naor, J., concurring); id. at para. 136 (majority opinion).
231. Id. at para. 84 (Barak, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at para. 89.
233. Id. at para. 92.
234 Id. at para. 93.
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the current form of the law violates not only the rights of those who
wish to get married but also the democratic values of the State and
the relationships between the communities who live in Israel.235 But
he reasoned that judicial deference required allowing the Parliament
a chance to revise the law rather than striking it down. Because the
law was temporary and due to expire within nine months, he voted
with Justice Cheshin to uphold it. He held that the Parliament will
need to find a less abusive means to achieve its security goals, for
instance by requiring Palestinians entering Israel to submit
extensive documentation to prove they are not threats, to refrain
from entry into Israel until granted a permit, to declare allegiance to
the State of Israel and to its laws, as well as a declaration forsaking
allegiance to any other country or entity.236 He stressed the need to
give the Parliament a chance to find creative solutions, but warned
that he believed the law would have difficulty passing a second round
of judicial scrutiny if it is not changed.23 7
The Israeli High Court's conflicted decision reflects the
confusion surrounding the enemy nationals doctrine. A narrow
majority of the Court (including Justice Levy) argued that enemy
nationality alone should not prevent a person's immigration, even in
times of war, though a small number of the potential immigrants
may pose a threat. But a law that imposes exactly such an exclusion
was nevertheless sustained, albeit only temporarily and on narrow
jurisprudential grounds.
Much of the confusion stemmed from the way in which
international and comparative sources were used. Superficially, the
lead opinion relied extensively on international law. But it would be
more precise to say that Justice Cheshin relied on the mere fact that
there is an enemy nationals doctrine in international law; he did not
explore how international law regulates it and arguably has
dismantled its foundations. Cheshin's simplification of the enemy
nationals doctrine has its roots in how the concept was imported to
Israeli academic literature. He relied extensively on the Israeli law
review article by Amnon Rubenstein and Liav Orgad, Human rights,
state security and the Jewish majority: The case of immigration for
purposes of marriage, published in 2006 in the Hebrew-language law
journal Hapraklit. Rubinstein and Orgad presented no original
235. Id. at para. 9 (Levy, J., concurring).
236. Id.
237. Id. at para. 111.
2007]
HeinOnline -- 38 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 313 2006-2007
314 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [38:263
research or analysis of the enemy nationals rule, but cited an
American law review article by Karen Engle238 that discusses its
existence. I have also cited Engle's work.239 But Engle's article is
actually focused on American domestic immigration law rather than
international norms, and it did not extensively analyze whether
enemy nationals rules are actually legitimate. Her thesis was that
American immigration laws in general are an index of which groups
are subject to disfavor at any given time. Thus, rather than conduct
direct analysis of the body of international law on which he relied,
Justice Cheshin depended on a second-hand account of an article that
was actually focusing on something else. This is not only flawed
judicial reasoning, but it is also an indication of how poorly
understood norms of international law can lend apparent legitimacy
to policies that may actually be illegal.
The true American ancestor of the Adalah decision is
Hirabayashi, not Korematsu. It is true that the Japanese internment
concerned a much more severe violation of human rights (racially-
based deprivation of liberty) than the Israeli law (discriminatory
limitation on family-based immigration). In theory, this distinction
should make the Israeli policy more easily justified. After all, if the
enemy nationals rule has any validity, it applies only to foreigners.
But it is important to remember that in World War II the United
States interned both citizens and aliens under the same policy. The
line between citizens and non-citizens blurred because they had the
same assumed connections to Japan. Like Cheshin's ruling in
Adalah, Chief Justice Stone's decision in Hirabayashi also concluded
that all members of a particular nationality are potentially
threatening because of their personal and cultural connections, and
that this potential threat justifies collectively violating the rights of
an entire group. While the Adalah case only concerned immigration,
Cheshin's logic is equally applicable to Arab citizens of Israel, many
of whom also have family connections not just in the occupied
Palestinian territories but in Palestinian refugee communities
around the Middle East. That is why Justices Joubran and Procaccia
were correct to see Cheshin's decision as opening the door to more
far-reaching infringements on human rights.240
238. Engle, supra note 102.
239. See supra notes 102, 103 and corresponding text.
240. Justice Procaccia noted that according to the State's evidence, many
more Arab citizens of Israel had been involved in terrorism than Palestinians
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On November 23, 2006, shortly before this article went to
press, the Government of Israel circulated a draft proposal to again
extend the ban on Palestinians from the Palestinian Territories,
which was set to expire on January 16, 2007.241 The draft would
expand the ban on Palestinians to include any "resident" of any other
country or territory where "activities liable to endanger the security
of the State of Israel or its citizens takes place."242 If applied literally,
this broad rule would give the government wide power to exclude not
only citizens from countries that are at war with Israel, but also"residents" of countries like Egypt and Jordan, and perhaps even
other states where anti-Israel militant groups may operate. Israeli
human rights groups expressed alarm that in addition to
discriminating against Palestinians the proposal would solidify the
ban on granting asylum to refugees from "enemy states. 243
Rather than singling out a particular nationality, the
November 23 proposal returns to the model used in Israel's Absentee
Property Law, whereby residence on hostile territory was the main
criterion for exclusion.24 4 But the new proposal represents a
continued evolution of the enemy nationals concept. The traditional
enemy nationals rule is rooted in the bond between a citizen and a
sovereign state. The 1950 Israeli definition of an absentee expanded
this to include temporary residence either in an enemy state or on
territory temporarily controlled by an enemy army. The 2006 version
expands the concept even further, including residents of countries
where any hostile activities take place. At time of writing, the
proposal was still pending in the Parliament, and if passed was
expected to face immediate challenges in court. This legal evolution
thus expands the enemy nationals concept to fit an era when most
warfare involves non-state actors who may operate in virtually any
entering Israel on family unity visas (247 compared to 26). With Justice Joubran,
Justice Procaccia raised doubts about whether security was really the State's only
rationale for the law, suggesting that it might also have been aimed at
maintaining a Jewish demographic majority in Israel. Adalah, supra note 220, at
para. 14 (Procaccia, J.).
241. Memorandum from Yehuda Zamaret, Legal Advisor to the Minister of
Interior (Nov. 23, 2006) (requesting comments from law school deans on the
proposed law). See also Shahar Ilan, Gov't seeks to extend order that can curb
Arab family reunification, Haaretz, Nov. 29, 2006.
242. Zamraet, supra note 241, proposed section 3D.
243. Shahar Ilan, Human rights expert: Extension of entry law meant to keep
out Darfur refugees, Haaretz, Dec. 5, 2006.
244. See supra notes 120-131 and accompanying text.
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country. But by this expansion, the enemy nationals doctrine will
have fostered dramatic and arguably limitless expansion of a state's
power to exclude people on potentially discriminatory grounds,
despite the fact that the rule is formally subject to substantial limits
in international law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Israel and the Arab states used the existence of the enemy
nationals doctrine to provide political cover for policies that were in
fact illegal and that deepened conflict in the Middle East. The
doctrine produced ambiguity where there should have been clarity. In
a conflict where ethnicity defines the armed struggle more than
international boundaries, the belligerents are tempted to define their
enemies accordingly, and hence blur the lines between combatant
and civilian while casting racial discrimination as a legitimate means
of warfare. This in turn contributes to a climate in which civilians are
often seen as legitimate targets in an armed struggle.
While Britain's nuanced and restrained wartime policy
prevailed in the drafting of treaties for the justification for
infringements of the Fourth Geneva Convention, it was Chief Justice
Stone's rationale for infringing the liberty of ethnic and religious
groups that carried the day in the Middle East. To a great degree,
this is a reflection of the fact that international law has often been
ignored in the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict. But neither Israel
nor the Arab states broke the law without restraint; they framed
their policies in a conscious effort to make them appear at least
plausibly legitimate. The fact that the enemy nationals rule still
existed in international law helped them do this. Israel, Iraq, and
Egypt all worried about obtaining international legitimacy for their
policies, or at least about blunting international criticism. If the
enemy nationals law had not produced confusion, international law
might have influenced government policy so as to lessen conflict and
protect human rights.
In the international arena, clarity is often essential to
translate law into political will. By contrast, ambiguity in the law
provides an opening for political exploitation. The Israeli and Arab
governments did not necessarily look for legal justifications that
could stand up in court, but they did look for plausible arguments to
give their policies the veneer of legitimacy. On their face, Arab and
Israeli policies have had much more in common with the U.S.
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internment of Japanese Americans than with British policies toward
Germans in World War II. Yet it was the British policies that gave
the policies a cover of legitimacy because the British approach was
embraced by international law. The impact of this quasi-legality
should not be minimized; the exile and dispossession of Palestinians
and Jews from Arab countries remain among the most sensitive and
divisive issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
I do not argue international law caused Arab-Jewish tension
and violence in the Middle East. But I do argue that legal ambiguity
acted as an enabler for ethnic conflict by easing the
institutionalization of discrimination and weakening the protections
owed to civilians. Clearer legal rules might have lessened the
severity of discriminatory measures by making it harder for
governments to legitimize more extreme measures; ambiguity
deepened discrimination and heightened the divisions between
warring groups. Ambiguity in the law made it more difficult for
international law to achieve at least four of its primary goals:
maintenance of peace, resolution of conflicts, protection of human
rights, and the shielding of civilians in armed conflict.
A natural response to the danger of legal ambiguity is to
strengthen international judicial mechanisms for issuing
authoritative interpretations in order to produce necessary clarity.
This proposition is currently the subject of an intense debate among
legal scholars following the 2004 advisory opinion by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) that Israel's wall/barrier in the
West Bank violated international humanitarian law.24 One of the
strongest criticisms of the ICJ's opinion has been that the Court
should have refrained from dealing with the issue because it was
overly politicized, and hence endangered the court's legitimacy.246
Others have applauded the ICJ's involvement, arguing that there is a
need for an independent body to clarify the standards binding on
states.247
245. Wall in OPT Advisory Opinion, supra note 22.
246. See, e.g., Michla Pomerance, The ICJ's Advisory Jurisdiction and the
Crumbling Wall Between the Political and the Judicial, 99 Am. J. Int'l L. 26
(2005).
247. See Richard A. Falk, Toward Authoritativeness: The ICJ Ruling on
Israel's Security Wall, 99 Am. J. Int'l L. 42, 49, 51 (2005) (arguing that there is a
need to upgrade the status of advisory opinions because "a primary role of
international law is to provide all international political actors, including states,
with guidance as to agreed standards of behavior."); David Kretzmer, The
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In a provocative essay, Michael Y. Kieval has recently
observed that the resolution of this debate depends on whether we
believe law should be descriptive or aspirational.2 48 Descriptive law
describes current state practices, and therefore faces little opposition
and "has the advantage of having people already following it." 49
Aspirational law "has the positive attribute of trying to make the
world a better place, but it is hard to implement, because many
countries... must be induced to change their behavior."250 Kieval
argues that humanitarian law should be descriptive rather than
aspirational because inconsistent and weak enforcement would
endanger the legitimacy of the law.2 1' The descriptive-aspirational
dichotomy is a useful analytical framework for understanding the
challenges facing international law, but Kieval's ultimate conclusion
in unconvincing. Treaty-based humanitarian and human rights law
has always been and probably always will be aspirational. In a world
where combatants and governments often commit abuses, these
bodies of law were from their earliest days a conscious attempt to
raise the standards of state behavior and to restrain political
impulses to compromise the welfare of vulnerable people.
The dangers of legal ambiguity are essential factors to
consider in this debate. Advocates of international judicial restraint
incorrectly assume that avoiding judicial intervention will de-
politicize international law. This assumption ignores the ways in
which governments can exploit ambiguities in the law to normalize
and legitimize destructive policies. Limiting judicial intervention
does not de-politicize law; it simply surrenders the legal playing field
to governments and increases the likelihood that political power
rather than principle will carry the day. At the end of the day, if
international law is to be relevant it cannot be neutral on high stakes
issues.
Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of International Humanitarian Law, 99
Am. J. Int'l L. 88, 102 (2005) (criticizing aspects of the ICJ's opinion on the
merits, but calling for judicial mechanisms for enforcing international
humanitarian law to be strengthened because the advisory opinion offered a"unique opportunity to address and clarify some of the issues that had previously
remained in the exclusive domain of the Supreme Court of Israel.").
248. Michael Y. Kieval, Be Reasonable! Thoughts on the Effectiveness of State
Criticism in Enforcing International Law, 26 Mich. J. Int'l L. 869 (2005).
249. Id. at 870.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 874.
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Whatever criticism one may make of the ICJ or other
international bodies mandated to interpret international law, they
are the only means we have to independently and impartially resolve
legal ambiguities in the international field. While lack of enforcement
and judicial overreaching can certainly undermine the rule of law, so
can leaving ambiguities about legal norms unresolved. At best, such
ambiguity will render international law irrelevant when standards
are needed most. At worst, ambiguity will aid political actors who
pursue policies that international law was meant to counter. This is
what has happened in the Middle East.
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